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Schedule UTP: An Insider's Summary of the Background,
Key Concepts, and Major Issues
J. Richard (Dick) Harvey, Jr.*
ABSTRACT
A former IRS Commissioner has called Schedule UTP "the big-
gest change in tax administration in the last 50 years." Others have
made less flattering comments, but most everyone working in the
corporate tax community would admit it has been a big deal.
Based upon the author's perception as a senior IRS official, this
article is intended to be a comprehensive discussion of three topics.
First, it will summarize what led the IRS to require the filing of
Schedule UTP. Second, it will discuss the key concepts, including
why certain provisions were adopted (e.g., the much misunderstood
"expect to litigate" provision). And finally, there will be a discus-
sion of the major issues, including in some cases the author's views
on such issues.
The article is written for several audiences, including: (i) corpo-
rate tax professionals who already have a working knowledge of
Schedule UTP and should be most interested in the discussion of
major issues and possibly the theory behind the "expect to litigate"
provision; (ii) students and academics who should be interested in
the entire article; and finally (iii) government officials who should
be interested in techniques corporations may use to avoid disclo-
sure, the definition of "reserve," whether Schedule M-3 should be
modified, and several other sections.
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[Vol. 9:349
SCHEDULE UTP
5.5.2. Corporation arguments
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5.5.4. Announcement 2010-76 and how the IRS could
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6. Summary
1. INTRODUCTION, PURPOSE OF ARTICLE, AND
INTENDED AUDIENCE
There has been much written about Schedule UTP since its an-
nouncement in January 2010. Many of the quotes have been eye-
catching, including:
* "UTP regime rattles corporate tax community"1
* "There is scarcely a tax professional working today who is not
familiar with the new schedule .... 2
* A former Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") Commissioner
called the schedule "the biggest change in tax administration in
the last 50 years."'3
There are many other quotes and comments,4 but most everyone
working in the corporate tax community would have to admit it has
been a big deal!
This article is intended to be a comprehensive discussion of three
topics. First, it will summarize the author's perception of what led the
IRS to require the filing of Schedule UTP. Second, it will discuss the
key concepts of Schedule UTP, including the author's perception of
why certain provisions were adopted (e.g., the much misunderstood
"expect to litigate" provision). Finally, there will be a discussion of
the major issues surrounding Schedule UTP, including in some cases
the author's views on such issues.
1. Jeremiah Coder, Year In Review: UTP Regime Rattles Corporate Tax Community, 2011
TAX NOTES TODAY 1-7 (2011).
2. Mary Lou Fahey, Transparency, Trust, and TEl, 61 TAX EXECUTIVE 369, 370 (2010).
3. Fahey, supra note 2, at 371; also direct discussion by the author with former Commissioner
Lawrence Gibbs, now with Miller Chevalier.
4. Some of the comments are sufficiently profane that they cannot be published in this article.
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The article is written for several audiences. For corporate tax pro-
fessionals who already have a working knowledge of Schedule UTP,
Section 5 (major issues) may be of most interest. However, the dis-
cussion of the reason for the "expect to litigate" provision in Section
4.3 may also be worthwhile. For students and academics, the article
provides a comprehensive discussion of the background, key concepts,
and major issues surrounding Schedule UTP.
Finally, for my former colleagues in government, Section 5 will be
of most interest, but the following sections may be of particular inter-
est: Section 5.3 (related to techniques corporations may use to avoid
disclosure), Section 5.7 (definition of "reserve"), Section 5.11 (discuss-
ing whether Schedule M-3 should be modified), Section 5.13 (sugges-
tion on how the IRS should audit Schedule UTP), and Section 5.14
(whether additional guidance will be the magic bullet).
2. QUICK SUMMARY OF SCHEDULE UTP5
Schedule UTP was first announced by IRS Commissioner Shulman
during a speech in January 2010.6 After various requests for comment
and a draft form, the IRS issued a final Schedule UTP on September
24, 2010.7 The basic concept behind Schedule UTP is that in a self-
assessment tax system, taxpayers should disclose uncertain tax posi-
tions at the time they file their tax return.
Given that disclosure on tax returns has been required for various
issues (e.g., Form 8886, related to reportable transactions, and Form
8275, related to positions that may cause a substantial understatement
of tax), the basic concept behind Schedule UTP is not entirely new.
Nevertheless, Schedule UTP has been very controversial because it
creates a direct link between disclosure in the tax return and decisions
made when preparing a corporation's audited financial statements.
Specifically, if a corporation (or a related party) records a "reserve"
for a tax position in its audited financial statements, Schedule UTP
requires the corporation to make a "concise description" of such tax
position. In addition, disclosure on Schedule UTP is also required
when a reserve is not recorded in the audited financial statements but
5. This summary is intended as a very brief introduction for those who have had no prior
exposure to Schedule UTP. For a general list of major IRS documents related to Schedule UTP,
see IRS, Uncertain Tax Positions - Schedule UTP, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/
article/0,,id=221533,00.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2011).
6. Douglas Shulman, IRS Commissioner, Prepared Remarks to New York State Bar Associa-
tion Taxation Section Annual Meeting in New York City (Jan. 26, 2010), available at http://
www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=218705,00.html; I.R.S. Announcement 2010-9, 2010-7 I.R.B.
408 (Jan. 26, 2010).
7. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41 I.R.B. 428 (Sept. 24, 2010).
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in arriving at such conclusion there was an assumption that there is a
greater than 50 percent probability the tax position will be litigated.
This latter disclosure is referred to as the "expect to litigate" provision
and it has been both misunderstood and controversial.
In addition to disclosing a "concise description" of a tax position,
Schedule UTP also requires disclosure of other information (e.g., a
ranking based upon the amount of tax reserve recorded for such tax
position). Some corporations and their advisors are concerned that
disclosure of a concise description will violate privilege or the work
product doctrine.
3. BACKGROUND THAT LED TO SCHEDULE UTP8
Although the IRS first announced Schedule UTP on January 26,
2010,9 the concept behind Schedule UTP had been discussed quietly in
certain tax circles for years. As will be summarized below, in some
cases it was discussed by taxpayers and their representatives as a com-
promise to address the IRS's attempts to obtain taxpayer's tax accrual
workpapers ("TAWs"). 10 In other cases, it was discussed within the
IRS as a way to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of corporate
audits. In addition, there were other factors that contributed to the
IRS's announcement in January 2010, and subsequent adoption of a
Final Schedule UTP on September 24, 2010.11 Below is the author's
view of the primary factors that led to Schedule UTP.
3.1. Practical difficulties auditing large corporations - Given the
complex nature of the tax law in general, coupled with the complexity
inherent in modern corporations' business operations, it has become
increasingly difficult for the IRS as a practical matter to efficiently
audit large corporations. This issue has been exacerbated by the ef-
forts of tax lawyers, accountants, and investment bankers to (1) iden-
tify grey areas in the tax law that could be exploited, and (2) once
exploited, make it an art form to minimize red flags in the corporate
tax return that might arouse the IRS's interest.
8. This background is based upon first-hand experience of the author, who participated
extensively in the development of Schedule UTP while he was the Senior Advisor to IRS
Commissioner Shulman. Others within government at the time may have different views.
9. See Shulman, supra note 6; see also I.R.S. Announcement 2010-9,2010-7 I.R.B. 408 (Jan. 26,
2010).
10. For current definitions of TAWs, see IRS, Internal Revenue Manual, § 4.10.20, http://
www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-010-020.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2011).
11. See I.R.S. Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41 I.R.B. 428 (Sept. 24, 2010).
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At the time he announced Schedule UTP in January 2010, Commis-
sioner Shulman estimated that 25 percent 12 of the IRS's audit time is
devoted to identifying issues, rather than discussing an appropriate
resolution of the issue. In addition, while in private practice, it was
this author's experience that the IRS failed to identify many issues
even after spending substantial time on issue identification.
Because these problems are not new, several different tax disclo-
sure regimes were adopted over the years. Examples include:
* Form 8275 used to avoid the substantial understatement penalty 13
* Form 8886 used to avoid the penalty surrounding reportable
transactions 4
* Schedule M-3 used to reconcile between worldwide financial ac-
counting income and taxable income' 5
Although the substantial understatement and reportable transac-
tion regimes provided some benefits to the IRS, the benefit was pri-
marily related to encouraging taxpayers to change their behavior.16
For example, after implementation of the substantial understatement
penalty, taxpayers generally would no longer take tax positions that in
their view did not meet the required threshold (i.e., either substantial
authority or more likely than not). Similarly, after adoption of the
reportable transaction regime, taxpayers and their advisors tended to
structure transactions so as to avoid reporting (e.g., confidentiality
agreements and contingent fees were eliminated).
Given that taxpayers and their advisors tended to structure around
these reporting provisions, the IRS was not receiving specific disclo-
sure on most uncertain tax positions being taken on returns. What
information the IRS did receive from these disclosures was likely of
little use. 17
12. Shulman, supra note 6.
13. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-383) allows the 20 percent sub-
stantial understatement penalty to be avoided if "the relevant facts affecting the item's tax treat-
ment are adequately disclosed" and other conditions are met.
14. I.R.C. § 6707A (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-383) imposes a penalty for failure to
include information with respect to a reportable transaction as required in I.R.C. § 6011 (West,
Westlaw through P.L. 111-383).
15. See Charles Boynton & William Wilson, A Review of Schedule M-3: The Internal Revenue
Service's New Book-Tax Reconciliation Tool, PETROLEUM Accr. & FIN. MGMTr., Spring 2006, at
1, 3. See also IRS, Published Articles on Schedule M-3 by IRS/Treasury Authors, http:f/
www.irs.govlbusinesses/corporations/article/O,,id=163246,00.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2011).
16. Author's observation; see also Pamela Olson, Announcement 2010-9: Can this Marriage Be
Saved?, 51 TAX MOMT. MEMORANDUM 227, 230 (2010).
17. For example, many of the disclosures may have been protective in nature (e.g., the tax-
payer believed it met the required threshold of confidence, but wanted to disclose so as to be on
the safe side). Nevertheless, both the substantial understatement and reportable transaction re-
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In 2004, the IRS announced Schedule M-3, Form 1120, Net Income
Reconciliation for Corporations with Total Assets of $10 Million or
More.18 Schedule M-3 replaced Schedule M-1, which attempted to ac-
complish a similar goal, but had significant deficiencies. 19 Although
Schedule M-3 can provide valuable information to the IRS,20 the pur-
pose of the schedule is to disclose a detailed reconciliation between
financial accounting and taxable income that may assist the IRS in
identifying tax issues. Schedule M-3 was not designed to directly dis-
close all material issues to the IRS. In many cases, Schedule M-3 will
not provide any clue there is a tax issue. For example, assume a cor-
poration records a $10 million expense in its financial statements, but
there is a question as to whether the $10 million is deductible. If the
corporation claims the $10 million deduction in its federal tax return,
there will be no reconciling item on Schedule M-3, and it will be of no
assistance to the IRS in identifying the issue.
In addition to specific disclosure regimes under the tax law, in 2006,
the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") adopted FIN
4821 which requires substantial disclosure surrounding businesses "un-
certain tax benefits" ("UTBs"). 22 One law firm has determined from
10-K filings that the 500 public companies with the largest UTBs have
in the aggregate over $200 billion of UTBs. 2 3 When the FASB was
debating FIN 48 there was significant concern the disclosures required
would provide a roadmap to the IRS.24 In order to address this con-
cern, the FASB only required disclosure of aggregate UTBs, rather
than UTBs by tax jurisdiction.25 Although FIN 48 disclosures are of
gimes may still be useful because of the favorable impact they had on taxpayer behavior (i.e.,
taking less aggressive positions).
18. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2004-91 (July 7, 2004).
19. Boynton & Wilson, supra note 15.
20. For example, the Schedule M-3, Part I reconciliation between worldwide financial ac-
counting income and the financial accounting income of those entities filing a consolidated U.S.
tax return should be useful. In addition, disclosure of permanent vs. temporary differences in
Parts II and III is very useful.
21. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, FASB INTERPRETATION No. 48, AC-
COUNTING FOR UNCERTAINTY IN INCOME TAXES: AN INTERPRETATION OF FASB STATEMENT
No. 109 (2006), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/aopFIN48.pdf [hereinafter FIN 48].
22. See FIN 48, supra note 21, 21. UTBs are effectively the amount of tax reserves recorded
for potential issues upon audit.
23. See Ferraro Law Firm, Ferraro 500 - Uncertain Tax Positions, TAX-WHISTLEBLOWER.COM,
http://www.tax-whistleblower.com/ferraro500/; see also David Kocieniewski, I.R.S. Plan to Un-
cover Companies' Tax Strategies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2010, at B1.
24. FIN 48, supra note 21, 1 B64.
25. FIN 48, supra note 21, 1 B64.
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some benefit to the IRS, as the FASB predicted, they have not pro-
vided a detailed roadmap. 26
In summary, one of the clear motivations behind Schedule UTP was
to address the practical difficulties the IRS has had auditing large cor-
porations. Although there were existing disclosure regimes (e.g.,
Forms 8275 and 8886, Schedule M-3, and FIN 48), they were not really
designed to directly identify the majority of specific issues in corpo-
rate tax returns. As a result, the IRS still has had to spend substantial
time identifying issues, and in many cases likely fails to identify all the
issues.
3.2. Success of the Compliance Assurance Process Program - In
2005, the IRS announced a pilot program titled Compliance Assur-
ance Process ("CAP"). 27 The purpose of the CAP program is to allow
taxpayers working with the IRS to resolve issues prior to filing of their
return. As part of the program, taxpayers commit to "communi-
cat[ing] information about completed transactions in a manner that is
timely and allows a meaningful analysis of material items affecting the
tax return. '28 In addition, taxpayers enter into a memorandum of un-
derstanding which requires even more specific disclosure.
Over 140 corporations have agreed to participate in CAP.29 In gen-
eral, the IRS has found the CAP pilot program to be successful, and
has decided to make the program permanent. One lesson the IRS
learned from the CAP program is that enhanced disclosure can be
valuable for improving both the efficiency and effectiveness of large
corporate audits. Unfortunately, as a practical matter, many corpora-
tions did not want to participate in CAP because of the disclosure
requirements.
In addition, if substantially all large corporations participated in
CAP, the IRS likely would have resource issues. Thus, the introduc-
tion of Schedule UTP could be viewed as the IRS's effort to increase
transparency for corporations with over $10 million in assets without
the need for them to all join the CAP program.30
26. FIN 48, supra note 21, B64; see also IRS, FIN 48 Implications - LB&I Field Examiners'
Guide, Answer #1, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=171859,00.html (last
visited Mar. 10, 2011).
27. See I.R.S. Announcement 2005-87, 2005-50 I.R.B. 1144 (Dec. 12, 2005).
28. Id.
29. Based upon author's knowledge.
30. See infra Section 5.8 for additional discussion surrounding the CAP program and Schedule
UTP.
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3.3. Impact of FIN 4831 - Over the years the IRS informally received
suggestions from tax professionals suggesting that corporations make
additional disclosures. In many cases, the suggestion was that the IRS
should request a specific description of tax issues from corporations,
but not request the reserve amount related to a specific issue. This
suggestion is similar in concept to the approach taken in Schedule
UTP.
Despite these suggestions, as a practical matter, it was very difficult
for the IRS to implement such an approach. The major stumbling
block was that it was difficult for the IRS to determine how to define
what issues should be disclosed. Some could argue the IRS attempted
to define the type of tax issues it wanted disclosed when it issued regu-
lations surrounding the reportable transaction regime,32 but as de-
scribed in Section 3.1, the primary impact of the regime was to change
taxpayers' behavior.33 Taxpayers, especially large sophisticated cor-
porations, continued to have many uncertain tax positions that were
not specifically disclosed on either Form 8886 or Form 8275.
At various times, informal suggestions were made to require corpo-
rate/business disclosures for tax issues with reserves in the audited fi-
nancial statements (i.e., similar to Schedule UTP). However, prior to
the adoption of FIN 48 there was significant diversity 34 surrounding
the recording of tax reserves in U.S. GAAP 35 audited financial state-
ments. For example, although most businesses recorded reserves on
an issue-by-issue basis, some recorded reserves on a year-by-year ba-
sis, or even an audit-cycle by audit-cycle basis. Furthermore, the stan-
dard for recording a reserve varied widely.36
Once the FASB adopted FIN 48, which requires that businesses an-
alyze tax reserves by unit of account (i.e., defined by reference to spe-
cific tax issues),37 it became possible for the IRS to leverage the FIN
48 analysis done by corporations for their audited financial state-
ments. Commissioner Shulman made reference to FIN 48 in his Janu-
31. FIN 48, supra note 21.
32. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4 (as amended in 2010).
33. See supra § 3.1. In addition, since listed transactions are included within the definition of
reportable transactions, the regime also provided a mechanism to require taxpayers to disclose
the existence of listed transactions once the IRS designated a transaction as listed. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6011-4 (as amended in 2010).
34. See FIN 48, supra note 21, B2.
35. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles is also known as GAAP. See Federal Account-
ing Standards Advisory Board, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, available at http://
www.fasab.gov/accepted.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2011).
36. See FIN 48, supra note 21, B6.
37. See FIN 48, supra note 21, 5.
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ary 26, 2010 speech38 announcing Schedule UTP. In summary, the
adoption of FIN 48 also played a significant part in moving the IRS
towards Schedule UTP.
Although clearly not pursued by the IRS, another approach might
have been to impose a very substantial strict liability penalty39 on any
understatement attributable to a tax issue that was not disclosed.
Such an approach would require Congressional action, and as a practi-
cal matter, would have had almost no chance of being adopted. More
importantly, even if it was adopted, corporations would inundate the
IRS with disclosures and the utility of the disclosures would be greatly
reduced. Thus, one benefit of linking Schedule UTP disclosure with
the tax reserve process was to target the disclosures to those that
should be of most interest to the IRS.
3.4. Impact of litigation surrounding tax accrual workpapers40 - In
discussing Tax Accrual Workpapers ("TAWs"), the U.S. Supreme
Court has stated: "In short, tax accrual workpapers pinpoint the 'soft
spots' on a corporation's tax return by highlighting those areas in
which the corporate taxpayer has taken a position that may, at some
later date, require the payment of additional taxes. '41
TAWs can be prepared by the taxpayer, the taxpayer's external au-
ditor, or both. Although the composition of TAWs varies from case to
case, they generally include both (i) a description of the taxpayer's
issue, and (ii) the reserve amount recorded in the audited financial
statements. In some cases, the TAWs may also include tax opinions42
surrounding the tax issues. In some cases tax opinions are prepared
by the taxpayer or the external auditor, and in other cases they are
prepared by external advisors.43
Needless to say, an IRS auditor would be very interested in ob-
taining access to (i) a description of a taxpayer's issues, (ii) the
amount of reserve for each tax issue, and (iii) any tax opinions. As
will be described in more detail below, there has been significant liti-
38. See Shulman, supra note 6.
39. For example, a 100 percent penalty would definitely have gotten business's attention.
40. See IRS, supra note 10, § 4.10.20.2 for the IRS's current definition of TAWs.
41. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 813 (1984).
42. This article uses the term "tax opinions" to refer to both formal tax opinions and other less
formal tax advice.
43. There is some uncertainty whether the IRS definition of TAWs includes tax opinions pre-
pared by, or for, the taxpayer. Specifically, TAWs are defined in the Internal Revenue Manual
to be part of "audit workpapers," and, as such, must be "created by or for the independent
auditor." See IRS, supra note 10, § 4.10.20.2. If a taxpayer prepares a tax opinion in anticipation
of litigation and then happens to also give the opinion to its auditor, has it created the opinion
"for" the auditor? Also, what if the opinion was not given to its external auditor?
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gation surrounding the ability of the IRS to obtain TAWs. The IRS
has won several cases (e.g., Arthur Young,44 El Paso,45 and Textron 46),
but it also has lost a few (e.g., Regions Financial7 and Deloitte48).
During the development of Schedule UTP, some within the IRS
were interested in requiring large corporations to disclose both (i) a
description of its tax issues, and (ii) the specific reserve related to such
issues.49 However, substantially all senior IRS officials were very con-
cerned about either (i) the perception of fairness surrounding such a
proposal, and/or (ii) whether the courts would uphold such a pursuit.
In addition, there was concern such an aggressive approach might ulti-
mately negate the ability of the IRS to obtain a complete set of TAWs
in cases where it is more justified (e.g., in a criminal case).
As a result, some of these executives advocated reaching a compro-
mise whereby large corporations would only disclose tax issues, but
not the reserves or tax opinions related to those reserves. In addition,
Announcement 2010-7650 was issued simultaneously with the final
Schedule UTP. Announcement 2010-76 provides that if information
was "otherwise privileged," the IRS would generally not argue the
taxpayer had waived privilege by virtue of disclosing the information
to the taxpayer's external auditor.5 1 One suspects some within the
IRS view the issuance of Announcement 2010-76 and final Schedule
UTP as a package deal designed to reduce the tension surrounding
TAWs, while still providing the IRS with information necessary to im-
prove the efficiency of its audits.
Given the above summary, a brief history of the litigation surround-
ing TAWs might be helpful. In 1984, the IRS won the Arthur Young
case at the U.S. Supreme Court.5 2 In summary, this case allowed the
IRS to obtain access to TAWs prepared by the taxpayer's independent
external auditor, Arthur Young. While the case was being litigated,
the IRS committed itself to a "policy of restraint" whereby it would
only pursue TAWs if there were unusual circumstances. The existence
44. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
45. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982).
46. United States v. Textron, Inc., 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009).
47. Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
41940 (N.D. Ala. May 8, 2008).
48. United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
49. This possibility was alluded to by Commissioner Shulman in his January 26, 2010, remarks
when he stated: "We could have asked for more ... a lot more . . . but chose not to." See
Shulman, supra note 6.
50. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-76, 2010-41 I.R.B. 432 (Sept. 24, 2010).
51. Id. at 2. See infra Section 5.5.4 for discussion surrounding some of the exceptions to the
general rule.
52. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 813 (1984).
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of this policy of restraint was referred to in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion as follows: "Although these IRS guidelines were not applicable
during the years at issue in this case, their promulgation further re-
futes respondents' fairness argument and reflects an administrative
flexibility that reinforces our decision .... ",53 Shortly after the Su-
preme Court's decision, the IRS reaffirmed its policy of restraint in
Announcement 84-46.54
Prior to 2002, the IRS is rumored to have requested TAWs less than
10 times over a 20 year period. In 2002, the IRS issued Announcement
2002-63,55 which modified the IRS's policy of restraint. In addition to
requesting TAWs when there were "unusual circumstances," the IRS
announced it would also pursue TAWs when a taxpayer entered into a
"listed transaction. '56 Specifically, if a taxpayer entered into one
listed transaction, the IRS would only pursue TAW information with
respect to that one transaction. However, if the taxpayer entered into
multiple listed transactions, the IRS would pursue the taxpayer's en-
tire set of TAWs (i.e., impacting all potential issues). 57
Given many corporations (especially financial institutions) had in-
vested in so-called SILO/LILO transactions and the IRS determined
such transactions were "listed transactions, ' 58 the IRS began pursuing
TAWs from many taxpayers. From 2002 to 2009, the IRS is rumored
to have requested TAWs from approximately 150 taxpayers. Al-
though these taxpayers were likely not happy about the prospect of
disclosing their TAWs to the IRS, substantially all did. However, two
points are worth noting.
First, some of the taxpayers negotiated with the IRS, and it is ru-
mored that a few were able to avoid disclosing their entire set of
TAWs. Rather, they may have only disclosed a description of the is-
sue, and did not disclose either the reserve amount or any tax opin-
ions. This result is similar to Schedule UTP, except that Schedule
UTP requires disclosure of tax issues upon return filing, rather than
upon audit.
Second, two taxpayers (i.e., Regions Financial and Textron) did not
reach agreement with the IRS and refused to disclose TAWs. In Re-
53. Id. at 821.
54. See I.R.S. Announcement 84-46, 1984-18 I.R.B. 18 (Apr. 30, 1984).
55. See I.R.S. Announcement 2002-63, 2002-27 I.R.B. 72 (July 8, 2002).
56. Listed transactions are transactions the IRS has determined to be a "tax avoidance trans-
action." See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4 (as amended in 2010).
57. See I.R.S. Announcement 2002-63, 2002-27 I.R.B. 72, at 2 (July 8, 2002).
58. See I.R.S. Notice 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 826 (Mar. 20, 2000) (IRS notification that LILOs
are listed transactions); see also I.R.S. Notice 2005-13, 2005-1 C.B. 630 (Feb. 28, 2005) (notifica-
tion of SILOs as listed transactions).
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gions Financial, similar to the Arthur Young case, the IRS issued a
summons to accounting firm Ernst & Young requesting their TAWs
with respect to Regions Financial ("Regions"). 59 Regions interceded
and directed Ernst & Young to withhold 20 documents from the
IRS.60 The IRS issued a summons, and Regions filed motions to
quash the summons.61 On May 8, 2008, the Northern District Court of
Alabama ruled in favor of Regions, concluding that disclosure of the
20 documents would violate the work product doctrine. 62
The IRS appealed the case to the Eleventh Circuit. However, in
December 2008, Regions provided the IRS with all of the withheld
documents. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the government's
appeal on December 30, 2008, prior to oral arguments.63 Depending
upon your point of view, the Regions case was a victory for the IRS or
taxpayers. 64
Although the Regions case was somewhat unusual because of the
surprise settlement, it pales in comparison to the twists and turns that
took place in Textron's case. In Textron, the IRS sought Textron's
TAWs directly from Textron and from their external auditors, Ernst &
Young. Textron refused to comply with the IRS summons, and litiga-
tion commenced in the District Court of Rhode Island.
65
In August 2007, the District Court ruled in favor of Textron by con-
cluding its TAWs were protected by the work product privilege.66 The
IRS appealed the case to the First Circuit. In a two-to-one decision in
January 2009, the First Circuit held that (i) the work product doctrine
protected Textron's TAWs from discovery because they were prepared
in anticipation of litigation, and (ii) Textron's disclosure of its TAWs
to Ernst & Young did not in and of itself cause a waiver of work prod-
uct protection, because Ernst & Young was not a potential adver-
sary. 67 However, the First Circuit vacated the District Court's holding
59. Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
41940, at *2 (N.D. Ala. May 8, 2008).
60. Id.
61. Id. at *1.
62. Id. at *28.
63. Paul Caron, Ventry: Regions Bank Settles Dispute Over IRS Access to Tax Workpapers,
TAX PROF BLOG (Jan. 7, 2009), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprofblog/2009/01/ventry-regions.
html.
64. Although apparently not a victory for Regions (unless they obtained some concession
from the IRS), the lower court decision was a victory for taxpayers in general.
65. United States v. Textron, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 141-42 (D.R.I. 2007), rev'd, No. 07-
2631, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1538 (1st Cir. 2009).
66. Id. at 154-55.
67. United States v. Textron, Inc., No. 07-2631, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1538, at *50-51 (lst Cir.
2009), vacated, 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009).
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and remanded the case to that court to determine (i) whether Ernst &
Young's TAWs reveal the information contained in Textron's own
TAWs, such that Ernst & Young would be treated as a "conduit to a
potential adversary," thereby causing Textron to have waived its work
product protection, and (ii) whether Textron had a right to obtain and
therefore must produce Ernst & Young's TAWs in response to the
IRS summons issued to it.68
Given that the district court's decision was affirmed in part, vacated
in part, and remanded in part, it is somewhat difficult to determine
who won the case. Taxpayers chose to focus on the court's conclusion
surrounding the work product doctrine that (i) the TAWs were not
prepared in anticipation of litigation, and (ii) Ernst & Young was not
an adversary. The IRS chose to focus on the remanded part of the
decision which left open the possibility that Ernst & Young could be
viewed as a conduit to a potential adversary. In addition to the gen-
eral confusion surrounding the decision, the dissenting judge effec-
tively urged the IRS to request the case be heard by the entire First
Circuit (i.e., request an en banc review). 69 The IRS made such a re-
quest and it was accepted.
The en banc decision was issued in August 2009 and concluded in a
3-2 decision that the IRS was entitled to obtain Textron's TAWs.70
However, the rationale for the decision was the subject of much de-
bate and the implications were potentially much broader than just tax
concerns. 71 As a result, Textron requested the U.S. Supreme Court to
hear the case (i.e., requested certiorari). Many amicus briefs were
filed challenging the rationale used by the First Circuit to decide in
favor of the IRS. However, on May 24, 2010 the Supreme Court de-
clined certiorari.72
Given the confusing case law described above, it is not surprising
that even after the en banc decision by the First Circuit in Textron,
there was still much dispute about the IRS's ability to obtain TAWs.
Some, mostly in government, believed the IRS had a clear right to
obtain TAWs in most, if not all cases. Most in the private sector were
much less certain and believed the rationale in the First Circuit deci-
sion was an aberration that might eventually be distinguished by other
circuits or overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 61.
70. United States v. Textron, Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 27-28 (1st Cir. 2009).
71. See Thomas Jaworski, Textron Could Affect Future SEC Accounting Inquiries, Panelists
Say, 125 TAX NOTES 296, 296 (2009).
72. See Jeremiah Coder, Supreme Court Denies Textron's Certiorari Petition, 127 TAX NOTES
951, 951 (2010).
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Given this background, some suggested a compromise whereby the
IRS only should obtain a description of issues, but not obtain the
amount of the reserve by tax issue or tax opinions. For some in gov-
ernment, this was viewed as a reasonable compromise. Thus, when
evaluating how Schedule UTP came about, one should consider the
ongoing litigation surrounding TAWs, and the potential need to reach
a compromise.
3.5. Summary of background that led to Schedule UTP - Given the
above background, the IRS made a decision to pursue Schedule UTP.
From my vantage point, the decision primarily resulted from the IRS's
need to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of all large, corporate
audits by obtaining enhanced transparency. The IRS was having
favorable experiences with the CAP program, but expansion of that
program to all large corporations was not practicable.
For some, the decision to pursue Schedule UTP coupled with An-
nouncement 2010-76 may also have been partially motivated by a de-
sire to reduce the tension surrounding TAWs.73 Finally, rather than
attempting to develop a new standard for disclosure, the issuance of
FIN 48 allowed the IRS to leverage the work done by corporations
when preparing their audited financial statements.
4. SCHEDULE UTP - KEY CONCEPTS7 4
This section will address the major operating rules and decisions
surrounding Schedule UTP as described in the instructions to Sched-
ule UTP:
4.1. Only applies to certain large corporations - Large corporations
are defined to be those with assets equal to or greater than (i) $100
million for 2010 and 2011; (ii) $50 million for 2012 and 2013; and (iii)
$10 million for 2014 and later years.75 In addition, only corporations
that file Forms 1120, 1120-F, 1120-L, and 1120-PC are required to file
Schedule UTP. However, the IRS has left open the possibility that
Schedule UTP could be expanded to other filers (e.g., flow-through or
73. The effort to reduce tension may have been partially successful. Per a quote attributed to
Eli Dicker from Tax Executive Institute, "at least the temperature has been dialed down a bit."
See Jeremiah Coder, UTP Guidance A High Priority, Wilkins Says, 129 TAX NOTES 165 (2010).
74. This discussion is based upon the author's personal experience and observations from
reading both I.R.S., 2010 Schedule UTP (Form 1120), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdfl
fll20utp.pdf [hereinafter Schedule UTP], and I.R.S., 2010 Instructions for Schedule UTP,
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/2010_instructions-for-schutp.pdf [hereinafter
"Instructions for Schedule UTP"].
75. See I.R.S. Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41 I.R.B. 428 (Sept. 24, 2010).
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tax-exempt entities) in the future.76 See Section 5.9 for additional dis-
cussion surrounding this possibility.
4.2. Effective date/ransition rule - Schedule UTP is only required for
tax positions taken in a tax year beginning in 2010.77 Thus, tax posi-
tions taken in pre-2010 tax returns are not disclosed on Schedule
UTP.7s In addition, Schedule UTP is not applicable to a short taxable
year that begins and ends in 2010.79
4.3. Piggy-backs on financial statement analysis - The general rule is
that disclosure is required on Schedule UTP if a corporation (or a
related party) has recorded a "reserve" for a tax position in its audited
financial statements.80 Thus, a corporation needs to determine
whether it has a "tax position," and whether a "reserve" has been re-
corded for such tax position.
A tax position is very broadly defined as a "tax position that would
result in an adjustment to a line item on that tax return (or would be"
included in a section 481(a) adjustment) if the position is not sus-
tained."81 If there is any uncertainty surrounding a tax issue, it would
seem to be a tax position. Thus, the key question is usually going to
be whether there is a reserve82 recorded in the audited financial state-
ments with respect to such tax position.
Disclosure is also required if a corporation (or related party) has no
reserve for a tax position, but the audited financial statements as-
sumed there is a greater than 50 percent probability a tax position will
be litigated (the so-called "expect to litigate" provision).8 3 The "ex-
pect to litigate" provision has not been well understood, especially by
those who do not have a working understanding of FIN 48.84 Before
describing the types of scenarios with which the IRS was most con-
cerned, a short description of FIN 48 may be helpful.
76. Id.
77. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 74, at 1.
78. However, see infra Section 5.10 surrounding tax positions taken in a pre-2010 year that
increase an NOL carryforward into a 2010 or later year. Some have questioned whether such tax
positions are grandfathered under the transition rule.
79. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 74, at 1.
80. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 74, at 1.
81. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 74, at 2.
82. See infra Section 5.7 for issues surrounding the definition of a "reserve."
83. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 74, at 2. Technically the instructions to Sched-
ule UTP provide that disclosure is required if there is less than a 50 percent probability of settle-
ment. However, given that litigation and settlement are the only two outcomes, this standard
equates with a greater than 50 percent probability of litigation.
84. FIN 48, supra note 21.
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FIN 48 provides a two-step analysis for determining whether a tax
benefit can be recorded in U.S. GAAP financial statements for a tax
position. First, the tax position must meet the recognition standard
which generally requires that the business believes it has a greater
than 50 percent probability of winning the issue in the "court of last
resort. '85 If the recognition standard is not met, the business records
no tax benefit which is the functional equivalent of a 100 percent
reserve.
Once the recognition standard is met, the business needs to deter-
mine the "largest amount of tax benefit that is greater than 50 percent
likely of being realized upon settlement with a taxing authority that
has full knowledge of all relevant information. '86 The FASB illus-
trated this concept through the following probability distribution
table:87
Possible Tax Benefit Individual Probability Cumulative Probability
100% 5% 5%
80% 25% 30%
60% 25% 55%
50% 20% 75%
40% 10% 85%
20% 10% 95%
0% 5%L 100%
100%
In the above example, the business would record a tax benefit of 60
percent (i.e., a 40 percent reserve) because it is the highest tax benefit
that has a cumulative probability of more than 50 percent (i.e., 55 per-
cent in the example).
The measurement step generally contemplates tax positions will be
settled with the taxing authority (e.g., the IRS). However, in some
cases, a business may expect to litigate a tax position. For example,
assume a business estimates it has a 60 percent probability of winning
the tax position in litigation and that litigation is expected. Although
this fact pattern is not directly addressed by FIN 48, accounting firms
85. FIN 48, supra note 21, 6. The "court of last resort" is the highest court that can hear a
case, even if it has the discretion to not hear the case. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court is the
"court of last resort" for federal tax issues. See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Guide to Ac-
counting for Income Taxes, § 16-2 (2009), available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/tax-accounting-
services/assets/2009-guide-accounting-income-taxes.pdf.
86. FIN 48, supra note 21, 8.
87. FIN 48, supra note 21, A21-A25.
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have generally concluded that a 100 percent tax benefit can be re-
corded (i.e., no reserve recorded) if the business believes it has a
greater than 50 percent probability of winning the tax position in
litigation.88
In the example above, if the business were to prepare probability
distribution tables, there would be a greater than 50 percent
probability (i.e., 60 percent) of receiving a 100 percent tax benefit and
thus no reserve would be recorded:
Possible Tax Benefit Individual Probability Cumulative Probability
100% 60% 60%
0% 4m 100%
100%
Given this possibility, the IRS had to determine whether Schedule
UTP should require disclosure of this type of tax position (i.e., when
no reserve is recorded, but the corporation assumed while preparing
its audited financial statements that litigation is expected). Although
no tax reserve would be recorded in its audited financial statements,
this is a tax position the corporation has determined must be substan-
tially uncertain if it cannot project reaching a reasonable settlement
with the IRS.89 The IRS decided it was reasonable to request disclo-
sure of a tax position when the corporation "expects to litigate" such
position. However, the IRS then had to develop an operational defi-
nition of "expects to litigate."
In the above example, it was assumed the corporation would litigate
the tax position. In the real world, corporations try to avoid litigation
if possible. Thus, if a corporation were to argue that it is "highly
likely" to litigate a tax position, it might have a difficult time convinc-
ing its external auditor that such an assumption is reasonable. A more
reasonable argument might be there is some possibility of settlement
and some possibility of litigation.
Again, FIN 48 does not directly address this sort of fact pattern.
While in private practice, the author became aware of two approaches
for addressing this sort of fact pattern. Under the first approach, one
would determine whether settlement or litigation was more likely.
Probability distribution tables would then be constructed based upon
88. See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, supra note 85, § 16.4.1.5.
89. It is theoretically possible the corporation may believe the issue is highly certain, but it
does not expect the IRS to agree with this conclusion. In such case, this author still believes
disclosure is appropriate. However, the instructions are not one hundred percent clear on this
point. See infra section 5.3.3.
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whichever alternative was more likely. For example, if there was a
greater probability of settlement than litigation, then probability dis-
tribution tables would be based upon settlement scenarios. If the re-
verse was true, the probability distribution tables would be based
upon litigation.
The alternative approach is to splice together probability distribu-
tion tables.90 This approach is more complicated and is best illus-
trated by an example. Assume it is 50/50 on whether there will be a
settlement vs. litigation. In addition, further assume that if litigated,
the business assumes it has a 70 percent probability of prevailing in
litigation. Given these facts, one might splice together a probability
distribution table as follows:
Settlement (50%) Litigation (50%)
Tax Cumulative
Benefit Probability x 50% % Probability x 50% % Probability
100% 35% x 50% 17.5% 70% x 50% 35% 52.5%
75% 35% x 50% 17.5% 0% x 50% 0% 17.5%
50% 30% x 50% 15% 0% x 50% 0% 15%
25% 0% x 50% 0% 0% x 50% 0% 0%
0% M% x 50% 0% 31M x 50% 15% 15
Total 100% 50% 100% 50% 100%
Given these facts, the "splicing approach" would result in the corpora-
tion recording 100 percent of the tax benefit (i.e., no reserve) because
the cumulative probability of obtaining the 100 percent benefit is
greater than 50 percent (i.e., 52.5 percent).
Because of the possibility a corporation may record no tax reserve
for a tax position, but still may have assumed a material possibility of
litigation while preparing its audited financial statements,91 the IRS
had to decide what threshold of litigation probability should trigger
disclosure on Schedule UTP. The IRS decided that if in preparing the
audited financial statements it was assumed "the probability of set-
tling with the IRS to be less than 50 [percent]," then disclosure is re-
quired. Said differently, if the probability of litigation is more than 50
percent then disclosure is required. Thus, in the above example, dis-
90. See, e.g., Danielle E. Rolfes et al., Schedule UTP: Ready or Not, Here It Comes, 26 TAX
MGMT. REAL EST. J. 267 (2010).
91. Although the rule was crafted with FIN 48 in mind, it applies equally to non-U.S. GAAP
financial statements. Thus, if while preparing such a financial statement a corporation assumes
there is a greater than 50 percent probability of litigating a tax position, then disclosure is re-
quired on Schedule UTP.
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closure would not be required on Schedule UTP because there is only
a 50 percent probability of litigation.92
In summary, although no reserve is recorded for a tax position, the
IRS determined that disclosure is appropriate when the corporation
assumed for purposes of its audited financial statement that there is a
greater than 50 percent probability the tax position would be litigated.
Such a fact pattern is indicative that the issue is (i) uncertain, (ii) the
corporation expects the IRS to challenge the tax position, and (iii) the
corporation does not believe it can reach a reasonable settlement with
the IRS.
Some have argued that requiring disclosure of an "expect to liti-
gate" tax position deviates from the general concept underlying
Schedule UTP (i.e., that it piggy-backs on the conclusions reached by
the corporation while preparing its audited financial statements). 93
These commentators suggested that if no reserve is recorded in the
audited financial statements, then no disclosure should be required on
Schedule UTP. Although the IRS could have reached this conclusion,
it did not. There are two reasons why the IRS's position is justified.
First, the "expect to litigate" provision does piggy-back on the in-
formation that was developed while preparing the audited financial
statements. However, instead of focusing solely on whether a reserve
is recorded, it also focuses on the assumptions used to determine
whether a reserve is necessary. Second, if the IRS had not adopted
the "expect to litigate" provision, some corporations may have started
arguing they were expecting litigation to avoid recording a reserve.
Thus, to some extent, one can view the "expect to litigate" provision
as an anti-abuse rule designed to minimize the temptation for corpo-
rations to make such an argument.
In addition to the criticism discussed immediately above, other
commentators have criticized the "expect to litigate" provision be-
cause they believe it might somehow violate the corporation's privi-
lege or work product protection. Given "expect to litigate" provisions
do not have to be singled out as such on Schedule UTP, the response
to this criticism is that the disclosure pursuant to the "expect to liti-
gate" provision is no different in concept than a disclosure of a tax
position when a reserve is recorded in the audited financial state-
92. However, if the probability of litigation in the example was 51 percent and all other facts
were the same, disclosure would be required on Schedule UTP. Given many corporations may
assume there is 50/50 probability of litigation vs. settlement, the IRS should consider changing its
definition of "expect to litigate" to a 50 percent or greater probability to require disclosure of
the above example.
93. See I.R.S. Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41 I.R.B. 428 (Sept. 24, 2010).
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ments. In both cases the corporation has determined there is some
uncertainty in the tax law. In one case they recorded a reserve, while
in the other case they did not because of the mechanics of FIN 48. If
there is an issue with the "expect to litigate" provision, then there
should also be an issue with the general requirement in Schedule UTP
to disclose tax positions for which a reserve was recorded. 94
4.4. Three parts to Schedule UTP - Schedule UTP is composed of
three parts:
* Part I - Location to disclose tax positions related to the current
taxable year. For example, if a corporation recorded a reserve in
its 2010 audited financial statements for a tax position in its 2010
tax return, such tax position should be disclosed in Part I of
Schedule UTP.
* Part H - Since it is not unusual for there to be a delay in record-
ing a reserve related to a tax position, Part II is used to disclose
tax positions related to prior taxable years that had a reserve
recorded in an audited financial statement issued after the filing
of the prior tax return. For example, if a corporation took a tax
position in its 2010 tax return, but did not record a reserve until
its 2011 audited financial statement, such tax position would be
disclosed in Part II of the 2011 Schedule UTP attached to its
2011 tax return. Part II includes a column to disclose the year a
tax position relates (e.g., 2010 in the above example).
* Part III - Location for disclosure of the concise description(s).
4.5. Concise description of tax position - Schedule UTP requires a
concise description of the tax position. A concise description is de-
fined to include a "description of the relevant facts affecting the tax
treatment of the position and information that reasonably can be ex-
pected to apprise the IRS of the identity of the tax position and the
nature of the issue." 95 The preliminary instructions to Schedule UTP
also required "the rationale for the position and the reason for deter-
mining the position is uncertain. '96
Several commentators raised questions surrounding the additional
requirement in the preliminary instructions.97 Specifically, they ques-
94. See infra Section 5.5 for discussion of whether Schedule UTP will withstand legal
challenge.
95. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 74, at 4.
96. See IRS Releases Drafts of Uncertain Tax Positions Schedule and Instructions, 2010 TAX
NOTES TODAY 75-8 (2010).
97. See, e.g., Neil Traubenberg, Comments of Tax Executives Institute, Inc. on Announcements
2010-9, 2010-17, and 2010-30 relating to Uncertain Tax Positions and the Policy of Restraint sub-
mitted to the Internal Revenue Service, 2010 TAX NoTEs TODAY 104-67 (2010); Stuart M. Lewis,
Chair, American Bar Association Section of Taxation, Comments on Announcements 2010-9,
2010-17 and 2010-30, 2010 TAX NOTES TODAY 104-66 (2010).
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tioned whether such disclosure is needed and could possibly violate a
corporation's privilege and work product protection. In reaction to
these comments, the IRS modified the concise description language so
that it is very similar to the language in Form 8275 related to disclo-
sure to avoid substantial understatement penalties.
Examples 10-12 at the end of the Schedule UTP instructions pro-
vide a description of the type of "concise description" the IRS is ex-
pecting. 98 One suspects corporations will agonize over the two to five
sentences that a typical concise description is likely to include.
4.6. Reserve ranking of tax positions - Schedule UTP requires a rank-
ing of tax positions based upon the amount of reserve recorded by
category of tax position (i.e., "T" for transfer pricing and "G" for gen-
eral). The intention of this disclosure is to alert the IRS to those tax
positions that should receive greater attention.
The draft Schedule UTP required corporations to disclose the
"maximum tax adjustment" (i.e., MTA).99 See Section 5.4 for addi-
tional discussion surrounding whether the change from MTA disclo-
sure to reserve ranking will give the IRS the information it needs to
select taxpayers for audit.
4.7. Tax position - As mentioned previously, a tax position is very
broadly defined. One concept that has been somewhat confusing to
some is that tax positions are determined on a year-by-year basis.
They are not determined on a transaction-by-transaction basis.
For example, assume a corporation enters into a transaction in 2009
that will result in uncertainties in its 2009, 2010, and 2011 tax returns.
In this fact pattern, the corporation has a tax position for each of the 3
years. The 2009 tax position is grandfathered from disclosure by the
transition rule, but the 2010 and 2011 tax positions may need to be
disclosed separately if reserves are recorded for each tax position.
Another basic concept surrounding Schedule UTP is that a tax posi-
tion should only be disclosed once. The best way to illustrate this is by
example. Assume a corporation has a tax position in its 2010 tax re-
turn and records a 20 percent reserve in its 2010 audited financial
statements. In such case, the corporation should disclose the tax posi-
tion in its 2010 Schedule UTP, Part I. Assume that in 2011 the corpo-
ration increases its reserve for the 2010 tax position from 20 percent to
40 percent. Since the corporation has already disclosed the 2010 tax
98. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 74, at 5.
99. See supra note 96.
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position, it should not disclose the 2010 tax position again in its 2011
Schedule UTP, Part II.
However, if the uncertainty that led to the 2010 tax position also
exists for a 2011 tax position, the corporation has two tax positions
(i.e., a 2010 tax position and a 2011 tax position). Assuming the cor-
poration also recorded a reserve for the 2011 tax position prior to fil-
ing its 2011 return, such tax position would be disclosed on Part I of
the 2011 Schedule UTP.
4.8. Other disclosures - As summarized in Part I and II of Schedule
UTP, disclosure of the following information is also required:
4.8.1. Temporary vs. permanent tax positions - Disclosure is required
of the type of tax position consistent with the accounting standards
used to prepare the audited financial statements.100 Temporary tax
positions are positions where only the timing is uncertain (e.g., it is
uncertain whether a deduction can be claimed in the current year or a
future year). A permanent tax position is a tax position that is not
temporary (e.g., exclusion of potentially tax-exempt interest income).
4.8.2. Pass-through EIN# - If the tax position taken by the corpora-
tion relates to a tax position of a pass-through entity (e.g., partnership,
trust, etc.), the EIN# of the pass-through entity needs to be dis-
closed.' 0 ' The purpose of this disclosure is to allow the IRS to deter-
mine what entity's tax return should be potentially audited.
4.8.3. Major tax position - A box needs to be checked if the relative
"size" of a tax position is equal to or greater than 10 percent of the
aggregate size of all tax positions disclosed. 10 2 "Size" is not defined in
the instructions to Schedule UTP, but most presume it is based upon
the size of the reserve as determined for reserve ranking purposes.10 3
For example, assume a corporation has disclosed tax positions on both
Parts I and II of Schedule UTP for a particular year and that the ag-
gregate size of the tax positions disclosed in both parts is $100. In this
case, any tax position with a size greater than or equal to $10 will need
to be labeled a major tax position.
100. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 74, at 4.
101. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 74, at 4.
102. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 74, at 4.
103. This position is supported by language in I.R.S. Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41 I.R.B.
428 (Sept. 24, 2010). In addition, on March 23, 2011, the IRS posted a FAQ on its website stating
the "size of a tax position is the amount of the reserve recorded for that tax position." See IRS,
Frequently Asked Questions on Schedule UTP, Question 4, http://www.irs.govlbusinesses/article/
0,,id=237538,00.html.
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4.8.4. Applicable code section(s) - Schedule UTP requires disclosure
of up to 3 applicable code sections surrounding the tax position. 10 4
4.9. Disclosure on Schedule UTP can do double duty - If a corpora-
tion discloses an issue on Schedule UTP, it is deemed to meet the
separate filing requirements for (i) Form 8275 (related to disclosure
surrounding substantial understatement penalties), and (ii) the new 40
percent penalty related to the codification of economic substance in
IRC 7701(o).105 However, if a corporation has a reportable transac-
tion, it must separately file Form 8886.
Prior to the advent of Schedule UTP, if a taxpayer filed Form 8275,
it could be a strong indication they had serious concerns about the
technical merits of the tax position (e.g., possibly less than 50 percent
probability of success). 10 6 Now, if the tax position is disclosed on
Schedule UTP, the IRS no longer knows whether the corporation has
serious concerns about the technical merits of a tax position. All the
IRS will know is that the corporation recorded a reserve for the posi-
tion, or expects to litigate the position.
One potentially outstanding question is whether the IRS will ulti-
mately require corporations to check some box on Schedule UTP if
they want to be deemed to have filed Form 8275. If such a box is
required, the IRS will then have the information it had prior to Sched-
ule UTP. If the IRS considers this approach, it should also consider
allowing Schedule UTP disclosure to do double duty for Form 8886,
related to reportable transactions. In such case, the IRS should defi-
nitely require that a box of some type on Schedule UTP be checked to
indicate disclosure is also being made to satisfy the requirements of
Form 8886.
4.10. Schedule UTP applies regardless of whether FIN 48 is used -
Although most corporations filing US corporate income tax returns
prepare audited financial statements using U.S. GAAP, Schedule
UTP applies regardless of the overall method of accounting (e.g., In-
ternational Financial Reporting Standards ("IFRS")) used to prepare
the audited financial statements. 10 7 Thus, if a reserve is recorded for a
104. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 74, at 4.
105. See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 12, 2010); I.R.S. Announcement 2010-
75, 2010-41 I.R.B. 428 (Sept. 24, 2010) (stating that a complete and accurate disclosure on Sched-
ule UTP satisfies the disclosure requirements of I.R.C. § 6662(i) - except for reportable
transactions).
106. However, some taxpayers also filed protective Form 8275s.
107. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 74, at 1.
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tax position in the audited financial statements, 108 such tax position
needs to be disclosed even if FIN 48 is not used in the audited finan-
cial statements. See Section 5.12 for a discussion of selected issues
surrounding corporations using IFRS in their audited financial
statements.
4.11. Uncooperative related party - Schedule UTP requires a corpo-
ration to determine whether either it, or a related party, recorded a
reserve with respect to a tax position. 10 9 Thus, when a corporation has
not recorded a reserve for a tax position in its own audited financial
statements, or does not have audited financial statements, the corpo-
ration should determine whether a related party has recorded a re-
serve with respect to the corporation's tax position. If the related
party does not provide such information, Schedule UTP includes a
box for corporations to check if a related party refuses to provide
information.110
This may sound somewhat confusing, but it is aimed primarily at a
situation where there is a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation.1 '
For example, assume a U.S. subsidiary or branch has a tax position,
but as often is the case, reserves are recorded in the foreign parent's
audited financial statements. If the foreign parent will not provide
information to the U.S. subsidiary or branch to determine whether a
tax position should be disclosed, the U.S. subsidiary or branch should
check the box on Schedule UTP. See section 5.3.2 for additional dis-
cussion surrounding uncooperative related parties.
5. SCHEDULE UTP - MAJOR ISSUES
There are many issues surrounding Schedule UTP. This section ad-
dresses those which are among the most significant.
5.1. Should the IRS be requesting corporations to complete Schedule
UTP? - Although to some extent, this is a relatively moot point since
the IRS is moving forward with Schedule UTP, most of the comments
108. Or there is an assumption that there is a greater than 50 percent probability of litigation.
109. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 74, at 1.
110. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 74, at 4.
111. It can also be applicable in the domestic related party context. For example, assume
domestic corporation P owns 75 percent of domestic corporation S, but they only prepare sepa-
rate company financial statements. Further assume S has a tax position, but the reserve is re-
corded in P's audited financial statements. In such case, Schedule UTP requires S to disclose the
uncertain tax position. However, if P will not provide S the necessary information, S should
check the box for an uncooperative related party.
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submitted to the IRS severely criticized Schedule UTP.112 The criti-
cisms were varied, but it should be noted that Schedule UTP caught
most corporate tax professionals by surprise. The major conceptual
criticisms surrounding Schedule UTP are discussed below:
5.1.1. Bad actors vs. all large corporations - Corporate tax profession-
als were aware of the IRS's efforts to obtain Tax Accrual Workpapers
(TAWs), but many viewed this as an IRS effort aimed at bad actors
(i.e., those who had participated in listed transactions or had unusual
circumstances 1' 3). Schedule UTP requires disclosure from all large
corporations, not just bad actors. Implicit in this criticism is that only
bad actors should be required to disclose issues to the IRS. One re-
sponse to this criticism is that in a self-assessment system like exists in
the U.S., it is appropriate for all taxpayers to disclose issues to the
IRS. This is especially the case for large, corporate taxpayers where it
is often difficult for the IRS to quickly and effectively identify tax is-
sues based upon the existing information provided in a return.
Another response is that as a practical matter, it is difficult for the
IRS to identify bad actors. Although participation in a listed transac-
tion could be viewed as being a bad actor, my experience is that it is
not a perfect indicator. For example, some taxpayers entered into ag-
gressive tax positions and fully disclosed such transactions at the time
the return was filed. Are these bad actors? Generally, I would say
"no." Rather, the bad actors should be those taxpayers who entered
into aggressive transactions and had no intention of disclosing the
transactions, and frankly hoped they would never be discovered by
the IRS.
In summary, it is important to note many corporations and their
advisors were surprised the IRS pursued disclosure of uncertain tax
positions from all large corporations, rather than just those who had
participated in listed transactions or had unusual circumstances. Nev-
ertheless, the IRS has valid arguments for requiring disclosure from
all large corporations.
5.1.2. Disclosure on return vs. audit - Schedule UTP requires disclo-
sure with the tax return rather than upon audit.1H4 To the extent the
IRS decided to pursue disclosure of tax issues, corporate tax profes-
112. See generally Jeremiah Coder, Commentators Ask IRS To Abandon UTP Proposal,
Change Schedule, 127 TAX NOTES 1064 (2010) (summary of comments); Joseph DiSciullo, Pro-
posed Schedule UTP Continues to Draw Fire from Commentators, 127 TAX NOTES 1099 (2010).
113. The IRS has used two criteria to determine whether to pursue TAWs. See IRS, Internal
Revenue Manual, § 4.10.20.3, http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-010-020.html.
114. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 74, at 1.
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sionals were expecting such disclosure to be upon audit1 15, not at the
time the return was filed. Thus, they were surprised again. The IRS
could have decided to only require disclosure upon audit, but the IRS
wanted to use Schedule UTP to help identify taxpayers for audit.
116
In addition, from a fairness perspective, delaying disclosure until the
audit would allow corporations to play the audit lottery.
5.1.3. Potential impact on financial accounting - Finally, some view
Schedule UTP as punishing corporations that take conservative posi-
tions in their audited financial statements by recording tax reserves
for uncertain tax positions. Said differently, there is concern Schedule
UTP will encourage/reward corporations for not recording tax
reserves in their audited financial statements. The IRS considered
this concern during the drafting of Schedule UTP. As described in
Section 4.3, part of the reason for the "expect to litigate" provision
was to discourage corporations from being tempted to record no re-
serve by assuming the tax position was likely to be litigated.
In addition, during drafting of Schedule UTP, several other "anti-
abuse" rules were considered. For example, the draft Schedule UTP
would have also required disclosure of tax positions that avoided a
reserve by virtue of the so-called "administrative practice" exception
in FIN 48.117 The IRS also considered requiring disclosure of tax posi-
tions with no reserve in various other scenarios. 118 If the IRS had
adopted these disclosure requirements, it may have eliminated some
of the incentive for corporations to avoid a reserve because such tax
positions still would have been disclosed.
Ultimately, except for the "expect to litigate" provision, the IRS
decided to not require such disclosures. Rather, the IRS is effectively
(i) anticipating that any efforts to avoid recording a reserve will be
relatively immaterial, or (ii) relying on external auditors to impose
some discipline on corporations. Time will tell whether this was a wise
judgment. One suspects the IRS may ultimately have to require dis-
closure of certain tax positions when no reserve is recorded in the
115. Because the TAW litigation resulted from summons issued during the audit process.
116. But see infra Section 5.4 for a discussion of whether the IRS will be successful in identify-
ing taxpayers for audit.
117. However, because of various comments received, in the final Schedule UTP, the IRS
dropped the requirement to disclose tax positions that avoided a reserve by virtue of the admin-
istrative practices provision. See I.R.S. Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41 I.R.B. 428 (Sept. 24,
2010). See also discussion infra Section 5.3.1.3.
118. See, e.g., infra Section 5.3.1.2 (related to entries on a "net effects schedule") and infra
Section 5.3.1.4 (related to tax insurance).
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audited financial statements (e.g., where an external auditor posts an
adjustment to a "net effects schedule"). 119
My personal view is that, in the aggregate, tax reserves in corpora-
tion's audited financial statements will not be materially reduced in
order to avoid Schedule UTP. Nevertheless, over time, corporations
will likely eliminate tax reserves on specific tax positions wherever
possible. In order to avoid being under-reserved, corporations may
increase reserves on those issues where a reserve is unavoidable. 120
Thus, the overall integrity of the financial statements should not be
materially impacted, but Schedule UTP has clearly created an incen-
tive to not record a reserve for tax positions, especially when it is a
close call on whether a reserve is needed.
5.2. Will the IRS automatically propose audit adjustments? - Once it
was clear the IRS was not backing down from Schedule UTP, many
corporate tax professionals became concerned IRS agents will auto-
matically issue proposed audit adjustments for all tax positions listed
on Schedule UTP. Senior IRS executives have on numerous occa-
sions stated this was not the intent, 121 plus at the time Schedule UTP
was finalized, the IRS issued an internal directive from Steve Miller,
Deputy Commissioner, to all Large Business and International per-
sonnel.122 The directive includes various items intended to address
taxpayer concerns. For example, it states:
"This means that items disclosed on a Schedule UTP may or may not
require an examination or an audit adjustment by the examiner.' 23
The jury is still out on how IRS field agents will use Schedule UTP.
The IRS is planning significant training, but there are likely to be
some growing pains. One has to assume at some time in the future an
IRS agent, with little thought, will propose audit adjustments for all
tax positions disclosed on Schedule UTP even though some are not
119. See infra Section 5.3.1.2 for additional discussion and description of a "net effects sched-
ule," which is also referred to by other labels.
120. This may be possible because there usually is a range of reserves corporations can justify.
Thus, if they currently record reserves in the low-to-mid end of the range, there may be room for
them to increase the reserve.
121. See, e.g., Alison Bennett, Tax Policy: Shulman Says IRS Would Consider Raising Asset
Threshold for Uncertain Tax Reporting, 71 DAILY TAX REP. G-9 (2010); Lee A. Sheppard, Offi-
cials Try To Assuage Fears About Proposed UTP Reporting, 2010 TAX NOTES TODAY 78-1
(2010).
122. See Deputy Commissioner Steve Miller, Directive for all Large Business and Interna-
tional Division Personnel: Reporting of Uncertain Tax Positions (Sept. 24, 2010), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroomlinternal-directive.pdf.
123. Id.
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warranted. If corporations believe an IRS agent is being unreasona-
ble, they should discuss any issues with IRS management.
5.3. Will corporations attempt to avoid disclosure on Schedule UTP?
- Given that many corporations are not anxious to be discussing un-
certain tax positions with the IRS,12 4 the clear answer to this question
is "yes. ' 125 Below are discussions of several approaches corporations
may take to avoid disclosure on Schedule UTP.126
5.3.1. By eliminating tax reserves - There are many variations of this
approach, but the end result of all will be the recording of no tax re-
serve in the audited financial statement. Specific approaches might
include:
5.3.1.1. Immaterial tax reserves - Many corporations may attempt to
eliminate immaterial tax reserves. Presumably external auditors will
agree with this approach on the grounds the tax reserves eliminated
are immaterial. However, it is not clear whether corporations might
adopt this approach immediately, or over time. For example, assume
a corporation has a recurring tax position starting in 2008 and that
historically reserves were recorded for these positions. Will the cor-
poration and its external auditor be comfortable eliminating reserves
already recorded? If not, will the corporation and its external auditor
be comfortable maintaining reserves for pre-2010 years, but not 2010
and later years? It will be interesting to see what develops, but one
suspects there will be a range of behavior with external auditors (and
fear of the SEC) being the governor on how far corporations push the
envelope.
5.3.1.2. Relatively material tax reserves - Some corporations may be
willing to eliminate a relatively material tax reserve with the expecta-
tion their external auditor will only include the adjustment on a "net
effects schedule"1 27 and not propose an adjustment to the financial
statements as a whole. External auditors accumulate potential adjust-
124. Either because they fear (i) an increase in their tax liability, or (ii) the time and effort
required to respond to IRS inquiries.
125. However, as discussed supra at Section 5.1.3, it is my view that aggregate tax reserves
should not be materially understated.
126. The description of these approaches should not be taken as an endorsement by the au-
thor. Rather, the descriptions are intended as an academic exercise. The hope is that both the
IRS and SEC will take steps to make it clear the use of these techniques will either not be looked
upon favorably, or preferably, outright prevented by changes to the instructions.
127. Also referred to as a Statement of Unagreed Differences ("SUD"), Statement of Adjust-
ment Proposals ("SOAP"), or by other labels and acronyms.
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ments on such schedules and will only require a modification of a fi-
nancial statement if the aggregate adjustment is material to the
financial statements as a whole. It should be noted that for public
companies, external auditors are required to disclose such unagreed
adjustments to the corporation's Board of Directors. 128 This disclo-
sure may discourage some public corporations from executing this
strategy.
5.3.1.3. FIN 48 administrative practice provision - FIN 48 allows a
business to meet the recognition standard and effectively avoid re-
cording a reserve "when the past administrative practices and prece-
dents of the taxing authority" are that they will accept a particular tax
position. 129 The draft Schedule UTP originally required corporations
to disclose this type of tax position under the theory that if a taxpayer
believed there was a widely understood administrative practice, they
should have no problem telling the IRS of such conclusion.
The final Schedule UTP does not require disclosure based upon
comments that it would be "unduly burdensome or corporations to
identify, describe, and quantify these positions, and would provide the
Service very little useful information." 130 As a result, it is possible
corporations may consider a more expansive use of the Administra-
tive Practice provision. But if they do, they will likely need to get
agreement from their external auditor.131
5.3.1.4. Insurance or a tax indemnification - Although tax insurance
has been an idea floating around for years, it never really had many
purchasers. It is possible, but not probable, that Schedule UTP could
increase the demand for tax insurance. In order for this approach to
be viable, a corporation will need to convince itself and its external
auditors that the proper accounting for an insured or indemnified tax
position is to record no tax reserve.
The proper accounting is likely to be the recording of a tax reserve
offset by a receivable for any insurance or indemnification pro-
ceeds.132 Said differently, netting the reserve with the receivable is
not likely to be the appropriate accounting. Nevertheless, this strat-
128. See PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD, AU § 380.10, available at http://
pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/AU380.aspx (last visited Mar. 13, 2011) (relating to audi-
tor's communications with the audit committee).
129. See FIN 48, supra note 21, 7.b.
130. See I.R.S. Announcement 2005-75, 2010-41 I.R.B. 428 (Sept. 24, 2010).
131. It is possible corporations may attempt to take this and other positions without telling
their external auditor, but they do so at their peril. If the impact of such positions is material,
they could be charged with criminal or civil fraud.
132. See, e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, supra note 85, § 16.2.1.5.
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egy may be useful in convincing an external auditor that an entry
posted to a net-effects schedule is immaterial to the financial state-
ments as a whole 133 and thus, no adjustment is needed to record a
reserve.
5.3.2. By checking-the-box for an uncooperative related party - As
described in Section 4.11, if a related party will not disclose whether it
recorded a reserve 134 for a corporation's tax position, the corporation
can check a box on Schedule UTP. It remains to be seen how many
US subsidiaries/branches of foreign corporations take this approach to
avoid disclosure; but some could. If the IRS wants to minimize this
opportunity, it should think about getting out the word that if the box
is checked, corporations should expect a very thorough audit. In addi-
tion to US subsidiaries/branches of foreign corporations availing
themselves of this technique, corporations with domestic related par-
ties may also attempt this strategy.
5.3.3. Can disclosure be avoided even though a reserve is recorded? -
The final instructions to Schedule UTP state the following:
"If the corporation or a related party determined that, under appli-
cable accounting standards, either no reserve was required for a tax
position taken on a tax return because the amount was immaterial
for audited financial statement purposes, or that a tax position was
sufficiently certain so that no reserve was required, then the corpora-
tion need not report the tax position on Schedule UTP."'1 35
Read in isolation, the above language could tempt some corporations
to argue that even though a reserve was recorded, disclosure on
Schedule UTP can be avoided. For example, assume a corporation
recorded a reserve for a tax position even though no tax reserve was
required because the reserve amount for such tax position would be
immaterial to the financial statements. 136 In this fact pattern, can the
corporation argue the reserve for the individual tax position was not
"required" and therefore avoid disclosure?
133. It is more likely to be immaterial since there are offsetting receivables and payables.
Thus, if the entry were made, the practical effect would be to only gross-up the balance sheet
which generally has a higher materiality threshold than an entry that impacts either P&L or
equity.
134. Or avoided a reserve though an "expect to litigate" assumption.
135. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 74, at 1 (emphasis added).
136. Based upon the author's experience, the reserve for individual tax positions are rarely
material to the financial statements as a whole. However, the total tax reserves for all issues are
often material to the financial statements.
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Given my understanding of what the IRS intended, coupled with a
holistic reading of the instructions and Announcement 2010-75,137 it is
clear the IRS intended the "immaterial" and "sufficiently certain" lan-
guage to only apply when no reserve was recorded in the audited fi-
nancial statements. For example, Announcement 2010-75 states:
"Some commentators opposed the proposal because of their under-
standing that it required a corporation to report tax positions for
which no reserve was recorded . . .either because the position was
highly certain or was immaterial in the context of the audited financial
statements. 1 38 In addition, both Announcement 2010-75 and the In-
structions for Schedule UTP state the general rule that disclosure is
required if a reserve is recorded in the audited financial statements.
Even if one accepts that the quote discussed above only applies
when there is no tax reserve recorded, there still is an issue as to how
the "sufficiently certain" language interacts with the "expect to liti-
gate" provision. For example, assume a corporation is sufficiently cer-
tain that it is not required to record a reserve for financial accounting
purposes, but the corporation also anticipates there is a greater than
50 percent probability of litigation. In such case, which language con-
trols (i.e., the "sufficiently certain" or the "expect to litigate" lan-
guage)? One suspects the intention of the IRS is that the "expect to
litigate" provision controls, and thus disclosure would be required in
this example.
It will be interesting to see whether any corporations attempt to
make either of the above arguments. Given the lack of an effective
penalty for failing to properly complete Schedule UTP, one could im-
agine some corporations being tempted. Thus, the IRS should con-
sider modifying the language in its instructions to make it clear that (i)
the sufficiently certain and immaterial language are only intended to
apply when there is no reserve, 139 and (ii) the "expect to litigate" lan-
guage trumps the "sufficiently certain" language.
5.4. Will reserve ranking give the IRS information it needs? 140 - One
of the stated goals of Schedule UTP is to allow the IRS to prioritize
issues for a taxpayer already selected for audit, while another goal is
137. I.R.S. Announcement 2005-75, 2010-41 I.R.B. 428 (Sept. 24, 2010).
138. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
139. In addition, as discussed infra at Section 5.7, the IRS should consider imposing a penalty
for failure to file, or adequately file, Schedule UTP.
140. In the scope of issues surrounding Schedule UTP, this is not that important, but never-
theless it will be difficult for the IRS to meet one of its stated goals (i.e., assist in selecting
taxpayers for audit).
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to help determine which corporations should be audited.141 The draft
Schedule UTP required disclosure of the maximum tax adjustment
(MTA) which is the amount of tax at stake for a particular tax issue.
For example, if a corporation deducted $100, but it was uncertain
whether the tax position would be sustained, the MTA would equal
$100 x 35% = $35.
The final Schedule UTP eliminated the MTA approach and substi-
tuted the reserve ranking approach discussed previously. The IRS be-
lieves the reserve ranking approach will adequately prioritize issues
once a corporation has been selected for audit.142 In a prior article,
this author concluded the reserve ranking approach will do little to
help the IRS select corporations for audit, especially when compared
with the MTA approach. 143 The reason is that the reserve ranking
approach eliminates all reference to the absolute size of an issue. The
MTA approach would have allowed the IRS to aggregate the MTAs
for a particular corporation and determine whether they were rela-
tively large for a corporation of a particular size. If the IRS were to
ever reconsider using a MTA approach, it should require disclosure
within certain MTA ranges, rather than the specific MTA amounts as
originally proposed.
If the IRS wants to select a corporation for audit using the reserve
ranking approach, they will need to focus on the number of issues and
the concise description. There will be no information on absolute size
of the tax positions disclosed. It is possible that the change from MTA
to reserve ranking is indicative that the IRS is planning to use the
Schedule UTP mostly as an aid for corporations it has selected for
audit, rather than as a tool for selecting specific corporations for audit.
5.5. Will Schedule UTP withstand legal challenge? - After Commis-
sioner Shulman's January 2010 announcement of Schedule UTP, sev-
eral commentators 144 questioned whether the "concise description"
proposal violated a corporation's privilege or work product protec-
tions. As discussed in Section 4.5, the IRS made changes in the final
Schedule UTP that attempted to address these concerns. Neverthe-
less, some corporations and their advisors still believe Schedule UTP
141. See I.R.S. Announcement 2010-9, 2010-7 I.R.B. 408 (Jan. 26, 2010).
142. However, since there is no reserve for "expect to litigate" tax positions, the IRS had to
determine where they would be disclosed in the reserve ranking process. The IRS determined
the corporation could choose how to rank expect to litigate positions. It will be interesting to see
what ranking strategies corporations employ.
143. See J. Richard Harvey, Jr., Schedule UTP Guidance - Initial Observations, 129 TAx
NoTEs 115 (2010).
144. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 97; Olson, supra note 16.
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may violate privilege and/or the work product doctrine. 145 In the
Treasury Decision adopting the final regulation authorizing Schedule
UTP,146 the government referred to one such commentator as follows:
One commentator asked that the proposed regulation not be
adopted because Schedule UTP would require the disclosure of
privileged information. If the regulation is adopted, the commenta-
tor recommended it should state that taxpayer may assert any appli-
cable privileges to providing information sought by Schedule UTP
and that any disclosure of information on that schedule will not con-
stitute a waiver of any applicable privilege. 147
The government responded to the comment by stating: "Provisions
relating to the assertion of privilege are not included in this regula-
tion, since it does not affect the existence of any applicable privileges
taxpayers may have concerning information requested by a return or
how they may assert those privileges. '148
In summary, the government does not believe Schedule UTP vio-
lates privilege or work product, but if challenged by corporations, it
will ultimately be up to the courts. The challenge to Schedule UTP
will likely be on the grounds that the "concise description" required
by Schedule UTP contains (i) mental impressions of a corporation or
its counsel that are sufficient to require work product protection,149 or
alternatively (ii) advice that is protected under attorney-client or ac-
countant-client privilege.1 50 Given the importance of this question,
there likely will be a lot written on the subject. Thus, what follows is a
sampling of the arguments that could be made.
5.5.1. IRS arguments:
0 Statutory and regulatory authority - The IRS has very broad au-
thority under I.R.C. §§ 6001, 6011, and 6012 to request information on
a tax return. For example, § 6011 states: "Every person required to
make a return or statement shall include therein the information re-
quired by such forms or regulations.' 151 In addition, the IRS and
Treasury Department have issued specific regulations authorizing
Schedule UTP. 152 Since the recent U.S. Supreme Court case in
145. See, e.g., Amy Elliott, Practitioners Consider Whether Schedule UTP Contains Protected
Work Product, 2010 TAX NOTES TODAY 194-2 (2010).
146. T.D. 9510, 2011-6 I.R.B. 453 (2010).
147. Id. at 3.
148. Id. at 4.
149. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
150. See I.R.C. § 7525 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-383) (discussing privilege related to
federally authorized practitioners such as accountants).
151. I.R.C. § 6011(a) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-383).
152. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(a)(4), (5) (2010); T.D. 9510, 2011-6 I.R.B. 453 (2010).
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Mayo153 gives Chevron deference 154 to interpretative regulations that
go through a notice and comment process, 155 the IRS will likely argue
that Treasury Regulation § 1.6012-2(a)(4) should be given such
deference.
• Judicial authority - The IRS will likely cite the three cases that
allowed the IRS access to a complete set of TAWs (i.e., not only a
description of the issue, but also the amount of tax reserve for each
issue), which were the Arthur Young,156 El Paso,157 and Textron158
cases. The following language in Arthur Young may be particularly
helpful:
Our complex and comprehensive system of federal taxation, relying
as it does upon self-assessment and reporting, demands that all tax-
payers be forthright in the disclosure of relevant information to the
taxing authorities. Without such disclosure, and the concomitant
power of the Government to compel disclosure, our national tax
burden would not be fairly and equitably distributed. In order to
encourage effective tax investigations, Congress has endowed the
IRS with expansive information-gathering authority .... 159
* Policy argument - Building on the language in Arthur Young, the
IRS would likely argue that in a self-assessment system, it is reasona-
ble for the IRS to ask taxpayers to disclose an issue as long as the IRS
is not asking for the taxpayer's detailed evaluation of the issue (i.e., a
tax opinion or the reserve amount). The IRS would also then likely
point to its policy of restraint in general, and specifically Announce-
ment 2010-76160 which generally makes it more difficult for the IRS to
obtain otherwise privileged documents. They could go on to cite Ar-
thur Young which states: "Recognizing the intrusiveness of demands
for the production of tax accrual workpapers, the IRS has demon-
strated administrative sensitivity to the concerns expressed by the ac-
counting profession by tightening its internal requirements for the
issuance of such summonses."'161
153. Mayo Found. Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
154. Chevron deference means that if there is uncertainty in the statutory construction or
legislative history, an administrative agency's regulation will be upheld as long as it results in a
reasonable interpretation. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984).
155. The Treasury regulation authorizing Schedule UTP (i.e., Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(a)(4), (5)
(2010)) went through notice and comment.
156. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
157. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982).
158. United States v. Textron, Inc., 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009).
159. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 815-16.
160. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-76, 2010-41 I.R.B. 432 (Sept. 24, 2010).
161. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 820.
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5.5.2. Corporation arguments - Corporations will first argue that priv-
ilege/work product protections should trump the IRC and regulations.
They will then argue that disclosure of only a concise explanation
could still violate privilege/work product protections because of the
analysis that went into the determination that a reserve was required.
Said differently, disclosure of the existence of a reserve is disclosing to
the IRS that there was sufficient uncertainty surrounding a position
that a reserve was needed.
If corporations are successful in planting some doubt in the judge's
mind, they will then likely attempt to distinguish their facts from the
above cases likely to be cited by the IRS. For example, corporations
could attempt to distinguish their facts from the Arthur Young case on
the following grounds:
* IRS authority for Schedule UTP comes from I.R.C. §§ 6001,
6011, and 6012, whereas the authority in Arthur Young is based on
I.R.C. § 7602 (i.e., the IRS's summons authority).
; When Arthur Young was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1984, the IRS's policy of restraint only allowed the IRS access to
TAWs in "unusual circumstances". Since Arthur Young, the IRS
has changed its policy of restraint twice by expanding the fact pat-
terns when TAWs will be requested. First, Announcement 2002-
63162 allowed the IRS to also obtain TAWs when a taxpayer has
listed transactions.1 63 Second, upon issuance of Schedule UTP,
which now allows the IRS to obtain a concise description of tax po-
sitions for all large corporations.
9 Arthur Young was a criminal case while Schedule UTP would
apply to all large corporations.
* Arthur Young was decided before Congress adopted the privi-
lege in I.R.C. § 7525 for an authorized federal practioner.
* In Arthur Young the TAWs were prepared by the external audi-
tor, not the taxpayer. 164
In addition, corporations could cite the Regions Financial1 65 case that
was favorable to corporations. Other cases 166 that are favorable to
corporations include Deloitte,167 Adlman,a68 and Roxworthy.169
162. I.R.S. Announcement 2002-63, 2002-27 I.R.B. 72 (July 8, 2002).
163. Listed transactions are defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (as amended in 2010) and
are transactions the IRS believes are very aggressive.
164. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 808.
165. Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
41940 (N.D. Ala. May 8, 2008).
166. However, these other cases deal with tax opinions, rather than just a description of the
issue.
167. United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (decided after the IRS
announced Schedule UTP).
168. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998).
169. United States v. Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2006).
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5.5.3. Evaluation of arguments - In summary, there are arguments on
both sides of the issue. If litigated, the key question a court will need
to address is whether a concise description of a tax position is suffi-
cient to violate privilege or work product protection. Clearly such dis-
closure is nowhere near as intrusive as requiring disclosure of the
reserve amount or tax opinion related to the position. Nevertheless,
some could argue the disclosure of the existence of a tax reserve for a
particular tax position is either disclosing the mental impressions of
the corporation and their advisors (i.e., that there was enough uncer-
tainty to record a reserve), or disclosing the results of discussions with
outside counsel.
Given these conflicting arguments, the court will need to evaluate
the arguments and weigh their respective pros and cons. In making
such an evaluation, a court could look at many factors, but ultimately
this author believes a court will need to determine whether it is rea-
sonable for the IRS to require such disclosure in a self-assessment sys-
tem. If the answer is "yes," then the IRS should win any future
litigation. If the answer is "no," corporations should win. This author
has stated in prior articles 170 that he believes the IRS holds the "high
ground." Since the IRS is not asking for the corporation's reserve
amount or tax opinions, Schedule UTP should be viewed as a reasona-
ble exercise of the IRS's authority under I.R.C. §§ 6001, 6011, and
6012, and not viewed as requiring corporations to disclose sensitive
information protected by privilege or the work product doctrine.
5.5.4. Announcement 2010-76171 and how the IRS could strengthen its
litigating position - Announcement 2010-76 was issued on September
24, 2010 concurrent with the final Schedule UTP. Announcement
2010-76 states the following general rule: "If a document is otherwise
privileged... and the document was provided to an independent audi-
tor as part of an audit of the taxpayer's financial statements, the Ser-
vice will not assert during an examination that privilege has been
waived by such disclosure."1 72
Initially the announcement seems very favorable. However, in ad-
dition to the general rule including some limitations, there also are
two specific exceptions to this general rule:
170. J. Richard Harvey, Jr., Schedule UTP: Views from a Former Tax Adviser and Administra-
tor, 128 TAX NOTES 1259 (2010), and J. Richard Harvey, Jr., Schedule UTP - Initial Observa-
tions, 129 TAx NOTES 115 (2010).
171. 2010-41 I.R.B. 432 (Sept. 24, 2010).
172. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-76, 2010-41 I.R.B. 432, at 2 (Sept. 24, 2010).
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0 If the taxpayer has claimed the benefits of one or more listed
transactions or because of unusual circumstances 173
* The taxpayer has engaged in any activity or taken any action
(other than disclosure to its independent auditor as part of the audit
of the taxpayer's financial statements) that would waive privilege.
Thus, it would appear the IRS can still request documents in various
circumstances. 174
Section 3 of Announcement 2010-76 also provides that if the IRS
requests Tax Reconciliation Workpapers (TRWs)175 during an exami-
nation, a taxpayer may redact, among other things, (i) the amount of
any reserve related to a tax position reported on Schedule UTP, and
(ii) other selected information surrounding the development of infor-
mation provided on Schedule UTP.176
At first blush, this sounds very positive for corporations until one
realizes that TRWs and TAWs are different.17 7 The IRS routinely re-
quests TRWs. 178 After careful reading, Section 3 of Announcement
2010-76 seems to be making sure IRS agents do not circumvent the
IRS's policy of restraint with respect to TAWs by obtaining sensitive
information (e.g., tax reserves) through requests for TRWs that in-
clude information related to Schedule UTP. The bottom line is that
an IRS agent can still attempt to obtain TAWs when there are either
listed transactions or unusual circumstances, or when the IRS agent
believes the document is not privileged.
After reading Announcement 2010-76 many times, this commenta-
tor is left asking: What did it really accomplish? My conclusions are as
follows:
* Tax reserve information - Prior to Announcement 2010-76, the
IRS could obtain specific tax reserve information upon audit when
there were either listed transactions or unusual circumstances. The
announcement has not changed this conclusion. However, the an-
nouncement does prevent the IRS from obtaining such information
through the back-door (i.e., by requesting TRWs).
* Tax opinions - This answer depends upon your starting point for
the analysis. There are at least two variables.
0 Are most tax opinions protected under the work product
doctrine? - If one assumes that most tax opinions (1) are "pre-
173. These are the same exceptions that apply to the IRS's policy of restraint for requesting
TAWs. See IRS, supra note 10, § 4.10.20.3.
174. For example, if the IRS decided to list a transaction that was previously disclosed on
Schedule UTP, or the IRS argued that a document was not otherwise privileged.
175. See IRS, supra note 10, § 4.10.20.2 (defining Tax Reconciliation Workpapers).
176. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-76, 2010-41 I.R.B. 432, at 2-3 (Sept. 24, 2010).
177. This author sheepishly admits it took him several readings before he focused on the TRW
vs. TAW distinction.
178. See IRS, supra note 10, § 4.10.20.3.
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pared in anticipation of litigation," and (2) the external auditor
is not an "adverse party," then Announcement 2010-76 does not
seem to provide any relief. However, if one assumes tax opin-
ions are not protected under the work product doctrine, then
the relief provided in Announcement 2010-76 is significant be-
cause it gives taxpayers an ability to avoid disclosing such tax
opinions to the IRS. It is a safe assumption that corporations
and their tax advisors are likely in the first camp, while certain
factions within the IRS are in the second camp.
o Are tax opinions considered to be TAWs? - If tax opinions
are part of the TAWs,179 then prior to the announcement they
could only be obtained if the taxpayer had listed transactions or
unusual circumstances, and this would not be changed by the
announcement. If, however, tax opinions are not part of the
TAWs (and they do not receive work product protection), then
the announcement would significantly limit the IRS's ability to
obtain them.
Where does this leave us? As indicated earlier, there seems to be
no change with respect to the IRS's ability to obtain specific tax re-
serve information. As to tax opinions, it depends upon your starting
point for the analysis. Most corporations and their advisors likely
view Announcement 2010-76 as moving the IRS substantially closer to
where the case law may have been heading (e.g., Deloitte180 ) and are
relieved they may not have to fight the IRS as frequently on access to
tax opinions. On the other hand, some factions within the IRS may
view Announcement 2010-76 as a major concession by the IRS.
This commentator views Announcement 2010-76 as a positive step
forward by the IRS in recognizing that it is generally not appropriate
for the IRS to pursue tax opinions and other sensitive information
prepared by taxpayers. In some sense, one could view Announcement
2010-76 as a partial acquiescence to Deloitte.81 However, the IRS
should have gone further. Announcement 2010-76 should have pro-
vided that, except for criminal matters, the IRS can never get access
182
to tax opinions and tax reserve information for tax positions properly
disclosed on Schedule UTP. There are several potential benefits from
such an approach, including:
179. See supra note 43 for a discussion of the uncertainty surrounding whether tax opinions
are, or are not, part of TAWs.
180. 610 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
181. One of the three documents at issue in the Deloitte case was a tax opinion prepared by an
outside advisor to Dow Chemical that was disclosed to Deloitte, Dow's external auditor, as part
of a routine audit. The IRS conceded the tax opinion would have been privileged, but for its
disclosure to Deloitte. The IRS then went on to argue work product protection should not apply
because Deloitte was an "adversary" to Dow. Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 133-34. Announcement
2010-76 effectively prevents the IRS from making this argument.
182. This should include upon examination and appeals, and preferably litigation.
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; Consistency with the IRS's statements that it is only pursuing
disclosure of tax issues, and not access to tax reserves or tax
opinions;183
; The IRS would improve its litigating position surrounding
Schedule UTP by effectively eliminating a corporation's ability to
argue that the IRS will get information on tax positions described
on Schedule UTP and then declare the tax positions "listed transac-
tions" in order to obtain tax opinion and/or tax reserve information;
* As drafted, the benefits of Announcement 2010-76 can generally
be obtained by any taxpayer. It is not conditioned on being a good
citizen (e.g., complying with disclosure rules). Arguably this ap-
proach was too generous on the part of the IRS. 184
* It would help address the lack of penalty surrounding Schedule
UTP (see Section 5.6 below).
5.6. Penalties - Many have asked what penalties apply for failing to
file, or adequately prepare, Schedule UTP? First, there is no specific
penalty attached to the failure to file, or to adequately file, Schedule
UTP. Second, theoretically a corporation could be subject to I.R.C.
§ 7203 penalties for willful failure to file a return or supply informa-
tion, but as a practical matter, it is very difficult for the IRS to prove
"willfulness."
Ultimately the IRS is going to need an appropriate penalty for fail-
ure to either file, or adequately prepare, Schedule UTP. Although the
IRS could pursue a specific monetary penalty with Congress, another
option was described at the end of the immediately preceding section
(i.e., Section 5.5.4). Specifically, the IRS should provide that, except
for criminal matters, the IRS can never get access18 5 to tax opinions
and tax reserve information for tax positions properly disclosed on
Schedule UTP. If a corporation adequately disclosed a tax position
on Schedule UTP, it would be protected from the IRS obtaining ei-
ther the tax reserve or tax opinions with respect to such tax position.
This carrot and stick approach could be very effective in inducing cor-
porations to adequately complete Schedule UTP.186 In addition, it
183. See Shulman, supra note 6 (stating that "[tihe proposal does not require the taxpayer to
disclose the taxpayer's risk assessment or tax reserve amounts.").
184. However, if one's frame of reference is that the IRS was inappropriately pursuing tax
opinions, then the announcement is not too generous. Rather, the IRS would be considered to
be adopting a more reasonable approach.
185. This should include upon examination, appeals, and preferably litigation.
186. If the proposal were adopted, I would expect substantially all corporations would decide
to disclose tax positions in order to assure protection of the related tax reserves and tax
positions.
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may also discourage corporations from eliminating tax reserves for tax
positions so as to avoid disclosure on Schedule UTP.1 8 7
5.7. Definition of "reserve"188 - The definition in the Schedule UTP
instructions is somewhat circular. Specifically, it states: "A corpora-
tion or a related party records a reserve for a U.S. federal income tax
position when a reserve for income tax, interest, or penalties with re-
spect to that position is recorded in the audited financial statements of
the corporation or a related party." 1 9
Although the above definition does clarify that a reserve includes a
reserve for tax, interest, or penalties, it does not define what is meant
by a "reserve." Most accountants and some lawyers know generally
what is meant by "recording a reserve," but like most everything in
accounting, there are grey areas. For example, are the following
reserves?
* Reduction of a deferred tax asset or increase in a deferred tax
liability to reflect an uncertain tax position
* Reclassifying a deferred tax liability to taxes payable
• Reducing a tax receivable claimed on a return to account for an
uncertain tax position
* Recording of a liability (or reduction of an asset) in purchase
accounting 90
* Various footnote disclosures:
0 Inclusion in the footnote disclosure surrounding unrecog-
nized tax benefits (e.g., FIN 48, paragraph 21)
o Reduction of an NOL or FTC carryforward in a corpora-
tion's footnote disclosure
187. If corporations did not record a reserve for a tax position and therefore did not disclose
the tax position on Schedule UTP, their tax opinions for such tax position would be at risk.
Thus, they may want to disclose an issue on Schedule UTP to protect their tax opinion. Some
might go on to argue this proposal would be an incentive for corporations to record a reserve for
every little issue and therefore inundate the IRS with disclosures on Schedule UTP. Although
this is possible, one doubts many corporations would take this approach because of the adminis-
trative burden of responding to IRS information document requests.
188. For a more expansive definition of this topic, see J. Richard (Dick) Harvey, Jr., Schedule
UTP - Two Major Issues, TAX NOTES (Mar. 28, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1782936.
189. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 74, at 2 (emphasis added).
190. When a business acquires another business, the acquirer needs to do "purchase account-
ing" (see FAS 141R) to accurately reflect the purchase on its balance sheet. Part of this process
is evaluating whether the target's tax reserves are appropriate. If an entry is made to adjust the
target's tax reserves, the offsetting adjustment is usually to goodwill, rather than expense. See
FINANCIAL ACcOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STAN-
DARDS No. 141R (revised 2007), available at http://www.gasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=
urldata&blobtable=mungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175820919432&blobheader=appli-
cation%2Fpdf.
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If a corporation is attempting to avoid disclosure of a tax position
on Schedule UTP, it may use the lack of definition to argue in certain
cases that a reserve has not been recorded. For example, the text
book accounting surrounding a FIN 48 tax reserve would generally
include the recording of an expense, the recording of a taxes payable,
and inclusion in the footnote disclosure of UTBs. However, in prac-
tice, short-cuts are often taken or relatively unique situations arise.
For example, when a temporary difference is involved, a business
may only accrue interest expense and decide not to make a reclassifi-
cation from deferred tax liability to taxes payable. In addition, in
purchase accounting, a business will record a reserve, but the offset-
ting entry is usually to goodwill, not expense. Without clarification, it
is possible some corporations may argue that all of the text-book re-
quirements for a reserve are required, as opposed to just one.
In addition, because of the uncertainty surrounding the definition of
a reserve, in some cases corporations may feel compelled to disclose
tax positions even though the IRS may not want disclosure at such
time. For example, should disclosure be required for certain tax
reserves included in deferred tax balances?1 91 Specifically, does the
IRS want disclosure only when the corporation has an uncertainty
that could result in the payment of cash (or reduction of a refund) for
a return already filed. Or, does it want to get disclosure sooner (e.g.,
when an NOL carryforward is increased by an uncertain tax position,
or more generally when a position is taken in a return that will not
produce cash tax benefits until a later year)? In addition, does the
IRS want to get disclosure more than once with respect to certain tax
issues? 192
Although the IRS has not defined reserve, some clue of what they
may have been thinking can be found in Example 9 of the Instructions
for Schedule UTP.193 This example assumes a corporation takes a po-
sition in its 2010 tax return that increases its NOL carryforward from
$100 to $150. The $150 NOL carryforward is fully utilized in 2011.
Given these facts, Example 9 assumes the corporation has a tax posi-
tion for both 2010 and 2011, but that it only records a reserve in its
2011 audited financial statement with respect to its 2011 tax position.
191. The type of tax reserves being discussed here relate to FIN 48 reserves, and not FAS 109
valuation allowance reserves.
192. For example, assume a corporation takes a questionable tax position in 2010 that pro-
duces a deferred tax benefit for financial accounting purposes, but will not produce a cash tax
benefit until 2015. Does the IRS want disclosure in 2010 only, 2015 only, or both 2010 and 2015?
193. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 74, at 3-4.
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Thus, the example concludes the tax position needs to be disclosed in
the 2011 Schedule UTP. 194
There are two interesting observations from Example 9. First, there
are two tax positions (i.e., 2010 and 2011). The IRS could have con-
ceivably viewed the 2011 tax position to be a continuation of the 2010
tax position, but it did not.1 95 Second, the facts assume a reserve was
only recorded in 2011, but not 2010. The unanswered question is:
Why didn't the corporation in Example 9 record a reserve with re-
spect to its 2010 NOL carryforward? Specifically, can one infer from
the example that the IRS may have been thinking of reserves as
amounts that only result in the payment of cash (or reduction of a
refund) for a return already filed (or about to be filed)? The short
answer is that it is not clear.
The reason is that if a corporation had a 2010 NOL carryforward of
$150, it could have potentially recorded a deferred tax asset in its 2010
audited financial statements. If there was uncertainty surrounding the
NOL carryforward, it may have recorded less of a deferred tax asset
to reflect such uncertainty. Accountants and FIN 48 would usually
refer to this as a "tax reserve." Thus, should one interpret Example 9
to mean the IRS does not consider the reduction of a deferred tax
asset to be a "reserve" for purposes of Schedule UTP? Since there
are other possible explanations for why the corporation did not record
a reserve in 2010,196 unfortunately one cannot draw a definitive
conclusion.
Nevertheless, one thing is clear. The IRS needs to clarify the defini-
tion of "reserve" to address this issue. In order to simplify the disclo-
sure, the IRS could consider defining reserves by reference to
liabilities (or reductions in assets) that relate to the payment of cash
(or reduction of a refund) with respect to the tax, interest, or penalties
for returns that are already filed (or about to be filed). This "cash"
approach would effectively delay disclosure on Schedule UTP until
such time as a tax return is filed, and there is some cash at stake. It
would not require disclosure when a reserve is recorded in deferred
194. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 74, at 4.
195. One could speculate as to the reason, but it could have been a concern that the definition
of reserve was not clear and the IRS was concerned that if concluded there was only a tax
position in 2010 and a corporation viewed itself as recording a reserve in 2011, the IRS may be
stuck with no disclosure.
196. For example, the corporation may not have thought the tax position was uncertain, or
alternatively, the corporation may not have been able to project sufficient future taxable income
to justify a deferred tax asset.
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tax balances or there is no cash at stake for a return that has already
been filed. 197
In addition to better defining "reserve," the IRS could consider nar-
rowing the definition of a "tax position" so that it is defined by refer-
ence to a potential change in the tax liability for a year, rather than a
potential change in a line item. The one problem with both of the
above "cash" approaches is that the IRS may want disclosure of un-
certain tax positions sooner in order to provide guidance to both tax-
payers and its agents. If so, the IRS could keep the broad definition
of tax positions and define reserves broadly to include reserves em-
bedded in deferred tax balances.
5.8. Compliance assurance process (CAP) - Many commentators re-
quested the IRS not require Schedule UTP for those taxpayers in
CAP since such taxpayers are already required to make significant dis-
closures to the IRS.198 At first blush, this request seems reasonable.
However, the IRS has not yet agreed. Instead, the IRS has indicated
it would be making the CAP program permanent and that it will be
expanded to three phases. 199 Although to the best of this commenta-
tor's knowledge, the IRS has not articulated its specific reasons, they
could be the following:
* A careful reading of the typical CAP disclosure requirement
could result in a slightly different disclosure under CAP vs. Sched-
ule UTP. For example, the standard memorandum of understand-
ing (MOU) generally requires that during the course of the audit,
taxpayers need to disclose facts surrounding transactions with tax
reserves. However, there is no need for the taxpayer to specifically
state it has recorded a reserve for a particular tax position. Thus,
disclosures made during a CAP audit may be somewhat less inform-
ative that those on Schedule UTP.
* If the disclosure requirements in the CAP MOU and Schedule
UTP are really identical, then corporations should not be objecting
197. For example, a NOL carryforward with imbedded uncertain tax positions. However, if a
corporation did not do textbook accounting and attempted to hide a current reserve in a de-
ferred tax balance, this definition should require disclosure because there would be a liability
related to a previously filed return where cash is at stake.
198. See comments by Tax Executives Institute and Miller & Chevalier referenced in Jer-
emiah Coder, Commentators Ask IRS To Abandon UTP Proposal, Change Schedule, 127 TAX
NOTES 1064 (2010).
199. See I.R.S. Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41 I.R.B. 428 (Sept. 24, 2010). The three phases
are pre-CAP, CAP, and CAP maintenance. See also LB&I Expands, Makes Permanent CAP
Real-Time Audit Program, 2011 TAX NOTES TODAY 63-1 (Apr. 1, 2011).
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to completing Schedule UTP since presumably all issues should
have been disclosed to the IRS under CAP.200
Another issue surrounding CAP is whether the IRS has the capacity
to handle all the corporations that may now decide they want to par-
ticipate in CAP. 201 There at least two reasons why corporations may
want to join CAP. First, they may want the general benefit of settling
years more quickly. These benefits include less financial statement
reserves and less difficulty managing the location of information from
prior tax returns.202
Second, large, complicated corporations often do not become aware
of tax positions until years after the position was taken on a return.20 3
Corporations may also initially be very confident of a tax position, but
as time passes and either the IRS issues guidance or court cases are
decided, the confidence level may decrease. 20 4 Regardless of the rea-
son, corporations often need to record tax reserves for these newly
found tax positions in their audited financial statements. If a corpora-
tion is not in CAP, they clearly will need to disclose such a tax posi-
tion in Part II of Schedule UTP. If a corporation is in CAP, there is a
possibility the year could be settled with the IRS before the corpora-
tion discovers the issue.20 5
In summary, the IRS is in the process of expanding and making the
CAP program permanent. In this process, the IRS should revisit the
CAP disclosure requirements and evaluate whether there are some
disclosure loopholes corporations may be exploiting when compared
to the disclosure required in Schedule UTP. If the IRS is ultimately
200. It is possible corporations are just trying to avoid duplicate disclosure, but it is also possi-
ble that some corporations disclose less information in CAP than would be required by Schedule
UTP.
201. See Jeremiah Coder, The Future of the CAP Program, 2010 TAX NOTES TODAY 55-3
(2010).
202. Through the passage of time, or acquisitions and mergers, it is often very difficult for
taxpayers to obtain information requested by the IRS during audit. If audits could be completed
quicker, this problem would be greatly reduced.
203. Most corporations make adjustments to pre-tax income to determine taxable income. If
a corporate tax department does not have a thorough understanding of how pre-tax income was
calculated when it filed its tax return, it is likely to have uncertain tax positions that will be
discovered over time as it better understands the components of pre-tax income.
204. A prime example of this was corporations' confidence level when they first entered into
LILO/SILO transactions. Based upon "will" opinions from reputable outside counsel, substan-
tially all LILO/SILO investors recorded no reserves. However, as the IRS started to question
the transactions and corporations started losing in court, reserves were then recorded.
205. Because of this second possibility, assuming the IRS does not already do so, the IRS
should consider requiring CAP taxpayers to disclose uncertain tax positions they become aware
of subsequent to the settlement of an audit. However, there may be a practical issue in defining
such tax positions because the taxpayer may not record reserves in its audited financial state-
ments for such positions (i.e., they may be considered "effectively settled" under FIN 48).
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satisfied with the CAP disclosure requirements, it may be possible to
eliminate the Schedule UTP filing requirement for CAP taxpayers.
5.9. Extension of Schedule UTP to more taxpayers - When Commis-
sioner Shulman first announced the corporate transparency proposal
in January 2010,206 it was not clear what taxpayers would be covered.
As the project progressed there was a decision made to initially limit
the proposal to certain types of large corporations.20 7 Thus, pass-
through entities and tax-exempt organizations are not currently re-
quired to file Schedule UTP. One could speculate as to the reasons,
but two that come to mind are:
9 FIN 48 generally requires a reserve to be recorded in the entity
with the potential tax liability - Since flow-through entities and tax-
exempt entities do not usually pay tax, tax reserves would generally
not be recorded for such entities. 20 8 In the case of a "true" flow-
through entity (e.g., partnership and certain trusts), the owners of
such entity would record most reserves. If the IRS wanted a true
flow-through entity to disclose UTPs that ultimately impacted the
owner's tax liability, it would have had to further deviate from FIN
48 by requiring some sort of hypothetical reserve calculation.
209
* IRS wanted to see how Schedule UTP worked for corporations
before extending it to flow-through entities - In addition, getting
the IRS systems reprogrammed to handle Schedule UTP was a big
job for corporations without also adding flow-through entities and
tax-exempt corporations.
Given comments in Announcement 2010-75 that the IRS may ex-
tend Schedule UTP to flow-through and tax-exempt entities in 2011,
or later years, it is clear this issue is far from resolved.210 If the IRS
does eventually extend Schedule UTP to such entities, it should con-
tinue to piggy-back on financial accounting. This will be easier to do
for tax-exempt entities, especially those with unrelated business tax
income. In the case of flow-through entities, one needs to distinguish
between true flow-throughs (e.g., partnerships and certain trusts) and
synthetic flow-through entities (e.g., Regulated Investment Compa-
nies and Real Estate Investment Trusts).
For synthetic flow-throughs, it should be easier to piggy-back on
FIN 48 because the ultimate tax liability should be at the flow-through
206. Shulman, supra note 6.
207. See supra Section 4.1 for the entities initially subject to Schedule UTP.
208. It should be noted that tax-exempt entities can have unrelated business income, and as a
result, can have tax reserves. In addition, there can be qualification and other tax issues for both
tax-exempt entities and flow-through entities.
209. The IRS would have needed to require the flow-through entity to perform a FIN 48
analysis for tax purposes even though it is not required for financial accounting purposes.
210. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41 I.R.B. 428, at 5 (Sept. 24, 2010).
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level and therefore if there are uncertain tax positions, reserves should
be recorded on the flow-through entity's audited financial statements.
However, for true flow-throughs, reserves will generally not be re-
corded because the owner of the entity will report the activity of the
flow-through on its own tax return.211 If FIN 48 is revised in the fu-
ture so that true flow-through entities need to disclose potential tax
exposures that ultimately will be borne by the owners, then extending
Schedule UTP to such entities would be more practicable.
5.10. Pre-2010 carryforward utilized in 2010 or later year212 - One of
the major effective date questions initially asked was whether the
Schedule UTP transition rule applies to a pre-2010 tax position that
increased a pre-2010 carryforward that is ultimately utilized in 2010 or
a later year? This was a major issue for corporations (e.g., financial
institutions) that had large NOLs during the recession that will be car-
ried forward into 2010 and later years.
As drafted, the instructions to Schedule UTP would seem to have
required disclosure on Schedule UTP when a pre-2010 carryforward is
utilized in a 2010 or later year.213 However, on March 23, 2011, the
IRS posted guidance on its website explicitly stating that the utiliza-
tion of a pre-2010 carryforward is protected by the transition rule.2 14
5.11. Should Schedule M-3 be modified or eliminated? - As described
in Section 3.1, Schedule M-3 was adopted with much fanfare in 2004.
It requires reconciliation between worldwide pre-tax income for fi-
nancial accounting purposes with taxable income as reported on the
US tax return. In Announcement 2010-75, the IRS announced it
would be creating a working group to study and revise Schedule M-3
to reduce duplicate reporting. The IRS also stated "the implementa-
tion of Schedule UTP is likely to reduce the need for some of the
information currently reported on the Schedule M-3. '' 21 5 Some com-
mentators have suggested to the IRS that, given the issuance of
Schedule UTP, Schedule M-3 should be eliminated. 216
This commentator believes Schedule M-3 should be modified, but
not eliminated. The only scenario that would support total elimina-
211. There could be situations where a real flow-through would record a reserve (e.g., qualifi-
cation issues).
212. For additional discussion of this topic, see Harvey, supra note 188.
213. Id.
214. See IRS, Frequently Asked Questions on Schedule UTP, Question 3, http://www.irs.gov/
businesses/article/o,,id=237538,00.html.
215. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41 I.R.B. 428, at 20 (Sept. 24, 2010).
216. See Traubenberg, supra note 97.
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tion is if for some reason the IRS decided to rely exclusively on Sched-
ule UTP for auditing corporations with $10 million or more of assets.
Given several of the techniques described in Section 5.3 for avoiding
disclosure on Schedule UTP, relying exclusively on Schedule UTP
would be a serious mistake. Thus, it seems clear the IRS needs Sched-
ule M-3 as a tool to help satisfy itself it has identified all material tax
issues. The two most important components of Schedule M-3 are (i)
the reconciliation between worldwide financial accounting income and
taxable income, and (ii) the identification of permanent and timing
differences. These components of Schedule M-3 should be retained.
What could be modified is that Part II and Part III of Schedule M-3
combined have approximately 70 line items to categorize various in-
come and deduction amounts. Are all of these line items really neces-
sary? One suspects not. In addition, when filing a consolidated
return, is it really necessary for supporting schedules to be filed for all
includable corporations? 217 Said differently, could the IRS just re-
quire Schedule M-3 to be filed on a consolidated basis?
5.12. International Financial Reporting Standards - Most of the world
uses International Financial Reporting Standards ("IFRS") to prepare
its audited financial statements. As of April 2011, there has been sig-
nificant discussion about the US potentially switching or converging to
IFRS in the future. Whether this will ultimately occur is far from
certain. 218
Currently U.S. GAAP (i.e., FIN 48) has relatively detailed rules219
surrounding the recording of income tax reserves, whereas IFRS does
not. In many ways, the accounting for tax reserves under IFRS is at a
similar place as U.S. GAAP was before the issuance of FIN 48. Thus,
businesses using IFRS have significant flexibility in their ability to
choose a unit of account for analyzing tax positions. For example,
some businesses record tax reserves by individual technical issue,
whereas others might record reserves based upon an entire taxable
year, or even an audit cycle.
The IRS was aware of this "unit of account" issue when it issued
Schedule UTP. As a result, the current instructions to Schedule UTP
provide special rules when the audited financial statements are pre-
217. See IRS, Specific Instructions, http://www.irs.gov/instructions/il20m3/chO2.html#dOe5
50, for the specific instructions to Part II and III of Schedule M-3 that state that for consolidated
returns, supporting schedules should be filed for all includable corporations.
218. See, e.g., Thomas Jaworski, SEC Considering Alternatives to Full IFRS Convergence, 130
TAX NOTES 761 (2011).
219. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 74, at 2-3. The FASB would prefer to call
them "principles" or implementation guidance, rather than "rules."
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pared on a unit of account based upon the entire taxable year.220 The
special rules provide that a corporation must instead identify a unit of
account based on principles that are "reasonably expected to "apprise
the IRS of the identity and nature of the issue. a221
It is my hope that eventually IFRS will require businesses to ana-
lyze tax positions on an issue by issue basis. However, until that time
corporations using IFRS in their audited financial statements will
need to wrestle with the language in the Schedule UTP instructions.
Those instructions are the one area where Schedule UTP does not
directly piggy-back onto the audited financial statements.
Finally, as currently designed, Schedule UTP requires corporations
to analyze tax positions in their audited financial statements on a tax
position by tax position basis. This design is crucial to the success of
Schedule UTP. If the U.S. ultimately adopts or converges to IFRS,
and there continues to be flexibility within IFRS to use a unit of ac-
count that is not based upon an individual tax issue, the IRS will need
to seriously rethink Schedule UTP.
5.13. How will the IRS audit Schedule UTP? - Although there has
been lots of discussion and concern surrounding how the IRS will use
Schedule UTP,222 there has been very little discussion on how the IRS
will make sure the Schedule UTPs it receives are accurate. As dis-
cussed in Section 5.11, continued use of Schedule M-3 may be part of
the solution However, my suspicion is that unless the IRS becomes
aware of a taxpayer blatantly failing to include tax positions on Sched-
ule UTP,223 corporations will more or less be on the honor system for
some period of time.
Eventually the IRS will need to figure out how to determine
whether all appropriate uncertain tax positions are disclosed on
Schedule UTP. Given that Schedule UTP ties into the audited finan-
cial statements, one obvious possibility is to have the external auditor
attest to the accuracy of Schedule UTP. To say such a proposal would
be unpopular with both corporations and the external auditing profes-
sion would be an understatement. Nevertheless, unless someone can
develop an alternative idea, the IRS should consider pursuing it in the
future.
220. The IRS should consider changing the wording of its instructions to provide that if the
unit of account is not based on a specific tax issue, the special rules are applicable. As currently
drafted, a non-US GAAP corporation could have a unit of account by audit cycle and the special
rule could be read to be inapplicable.
221. Instructions for Schedule UTP, supra note 74, at 3.
222. See supra Section 5.2.
223. See I.R.C § 7623(b) (2006) (authorizing the whistleblower program).
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5.14. Will additional guidance be the magic bullet? - Since the an-
nouncement of Schedule UTP, it has been have suggested that the
IRS should issue substantially more guidance so as to minimize the
number of uncertain tax positions that need to be disclosed on Sched-
ule UTP. In response to these suggestions, the Chief Counsel's Office
has stated publicly that it is aware of the increased need for guidance,
but has stated that in order to issue more timely guidance, practition-
ers will need to be more open to "pretty good guidance" (i.e., leaving
some questions unanswered). 224
Although the issuance of more timely guidance from the IRS Chief
Counsel's Office would be a very welcome development, this com-
mentator has serious reservations that sufficient guidance can be is-
sued to greatly reduce the number of uncertain tax positions. Even if
the amount of issued guidance was doubled (which is extremely
doubtful), the cold, hard truth is there a substantial industry of profes-
sionals (tax lawyers and accountants, and investment bankers) whose
primary job is to identify uncertainties in the corporate tax law and
exploit them. This is further complicated by the complex nature of
today's large corporations, many of which operate in countries around
the world.
Thus, unless tax professionals stop attempting to exploit uncertain-
ties in the tax law or Congress and the Administration somehow
greatly simplify our corporate income tax law (e.g., eliminate it), the
IRS will need Schedule UTP or some substitute to efficiently and ef-
fectively audit large corporations.
6. SUMMARY
This article has attempted to summarize, from a former government
official's perspective, the background that led to Schedule UTP, its
key concepts, and the major issues surrounding it. Although much has
been written about Schedule UTP, and there is likely much more to
be written, one thing is certain: It already has been a big deal. Corpo-
rate tax executives, their advisors, government officials, and even
some academics, have devoted significant energy developing, under-
standing, and criticizing Schedule UTP.
Now that the first chapter of the story is relatively complete, the
second chapter needs to be written. Specifically, large corporations
and their advisors will turn their attention to completing the 2010
Schedule UTP. Although Schedule UTP is based upon decisions a
224. Crystal Tandon, Wilkins Says Chief Counsel Focusing on UTP, Economic Substance, 130
TAX NoTEs 510 (2011).
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corporation makes while preparing its 2010 audited financial state-
ments, there will undoubtedly be significant time spent preparing the
2010 Schedule UTP-especially in drafting the concise description. 225
Once large corporations start filing Schedule UTP, or possibly ear-
lier for CAP taxpayers, the IRS will start writing the third chapter
with the main topics including (i) how best to use the information pro-
vided on Schedule UTP, and (ii) how to make sure field agents use the
information properly. The IRS will surely have growing pains as it
wrestles with the practical realities of sifting through thousands of
Schedule UTPs and attempting to control thousands of agents.
A fourth chapter could be written if Schedule UTP is challenged on
the grounds it violates privilege, the work product doctrine, or both.
If this chapter is to be written, it likely will start with some corpora-
tions filing 2010 Schedule UTPs with a statement that information is
being withheld because disclosure could violate privilege and/or work
product protections. Such a chapter could take a long-time to com-
plete, but as summarized in Section 5.5, the IRS should ultimately pre-
vail - if challenged.
In conclusion, Schedule UTP has the potential to substantially in-
crease transparency on large, corporate income tax returns, and in-
crease the IRS's efficiency and effectiveness while performing audits.
However, if corporations don't perceive a meaningful incentive 226 to
accurately complete Schedule UTP, the IRS could face huge problems
in obtaining the information it really needs to make Schedule UTP a
success. Thus, I urge the IRS to seriously consider implementing a
carrot and stick approach as described in Sections 5.5.4 and 5.6 of this
article.
In addition, the IRS needs to clarify many of the uncertainties dis-
cussed in this article, and minimize opportunities for corporations to
avoid disclosure. The most significant would seem to be: (i) the defi-
nition of a "reserve" (Section 5.7), (ii) methods corporations may use
to avoid disclosure (Section 5.3), and (iii) whether the IRS should re-
quire external auditors to attest to the information a corporation files
on schedule UTP (Section 5.13).
Finally, although the IRS needs to spend significant effort providing
more guidance in general, they should not believe it is the magic bullet
for making a meaningful reduction in the number of uncertain tax po-
sitions (Section 5.14). Given the complexity of the typical modern
225. On a per word basis, the few sentences providing a concise description may be the most
expensive in the history of many corporate tax departments.
226. Or penalty for failing to accurately complete the schedule.
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corporation, a meaningful reduction in uncertain corporate income
tax positions is likely to only result from a total elimination of the
corporate income tax.
